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No responsible  donor should undertake to "assist" or "use" non-
government organizations to help in development unless it is
prepared to invest in understanding their nature and distinctive
roles.  Financial incentives, wrongly applied, can destroy the
voluntarism of all but the most strongly self-aware of voluntary
organizations.
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encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry the namnes  of
the authors, rflect  only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings. interpretations, and conclusions are the
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Voluntary development organizations have  are simple neither in their organizational form
demonstrated substantial comparative advantage  nor in their development roles. They are particu-
in developing countrics - especially in their  larly complex in the aggregate.
ability to innovate, adapt to local conditions, and
reach and work with poor and difficult-to-reach  The only thing NGOs have in common as a
populations.  group is that they are nongovernment and are
legally registered as nonprofits.  NGOs include
These capabilities are a function of their  market-oriented public service contractors
values, special skills, small size, limited re-  (PSCs), values-driven voluntary organizations
sources, flexibility, and freedom from political  (VOs), and memb .r-accountable people's
constraints. Their weaknesses are a function of  organizations (POs).
many of the same characteristics - particularly
their value commitments, small size, independ-  Some VOs afe strictly voluntary and work
ence, and lack of administrative rigidity.  with no budget; others have well-paid full-time
professional staff.  Their commitments span a
In this paper on what makes nongovernment  wide range, and their participants range from
organizations (NGOs) tick, Brown and Korten  saints to scoundrels.
suggest that it is equally inappropriate to criti-
cize:  The strongest VOs and POs  spond to a
good deal more than financial incentives. Their
*  Voluntary organizations for their limited  strength lies in the fact that they are not the same
ability to provide routine services to large  as government organizations or businesses.  At
populations on a sustained, self-financing basis.  they same time, they are not immune to financia!
incentives, which if wrongly applied can destroy
* Govemment organizations for their limited  the voluntarism of all but the most strongly
ability to innovate and adapt responsively to the  aware of VOs and POs.  The issues are complex,
needs of many different groups.  the necessary data elusive (Brown and Korten
suggest a research agenda), and the potential for
* Commercial organizations for their limitcd  damage substantial.
ability to provide services below cost to persons
who cannot afford to pay.  Donors cannot automatically assume that
existing staff experience and training prepare
In relating to NGOs, they say, donors should  them to play a constructive role in helping NGOs
avoid the danger of equating small with simple.  become more effective in their essential roles in
Most NGOs are small by donor standards, but  national and global development.
This paper is a product of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Devel-
opment Division, Country Economics Department.  Copies are available free from
the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Zeny
Kranzer, room N-9051, extension 69485 (40 pages).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these fmdings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
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The decade of the  1980s  has seen a rapid increase of interest in organizations that
are  non-govermnental  and  non-profit  within  the  international  development
community'. These organizations are  commanding growing attention as  possible
alternatives  to  govermment in  addressing the  needs  of  populations  otherwise
unreached by official development programs.
The reasons  are nunerous,  including  the following.  The  search  for  new  options  reflects  a painful  realiza-
tion  that  in spite  of  a few  "miracle  economies,'  such
•  Growing  interest  among  donors  and national  as Taiwan,  Korea,  and  Singapore,  the incidence  of
govermnents  in strengthening  the developmental debilitating,  dehumanizing  poverty  persists  at unac-
roles  of institutions  outside  the public  sector.  ceptable  levels  in most  countries  and  regions  of the
South.  In country  after  country  the advances  achiev-
*  The  demonstrated  capacity  of  some  non-govern-
mental  organizations  (NGOs)  to reach  the  poor
more  effectively  than  public  agencies.
*  A sharp decline  in public  development  resour-
ces,  necessitating  a search  by governments  for  *  L ai  , X i  o
more  cost  effective  alternatives  to conventional  e  . -.
public  services  and  development  programs.  I 
•  The fact that NGOs  based in the industrial  *
countries mobilize US$3 billion a year  in devel-  ..  *..  a
opment  resources  from private sources  and
manage  another  US$1.5  billion  from  official  aid  "VI-I  .=c  l
agencies. 
*  An  awareness  that  some  NGOs  are  sophisticated
and influenial  organizations  able  to carry  out  X
programs  on a national  scale  and  to influence
national policies and insitutions.Organizations  - ..
such as the Bangladesh  Rural Advancement  in  r  i  ,  :.
Committee  (BRAC),  Philippine  Business  for
Social  Progress  (PBSP)  and the Pemvian  Insti-
tute for liberty and Democracy  are leading
examples.  _ed through economic modernization  have left largp  Bringing  order to this chaos is a challenge.  The
segments of the population behind.  World Bank has defined NGOs as 'private organiza-
In many countries, the  development gains of  tions  that  pursue  activities to  relieve  soffering,
earlier decades are evaporating in the  1980s.  The  promote  the  interests  of  the  poor,  protect  the
World  Bank's  World  Development R :porlt 1988  environment  or undertake community  devc!opment."5
reports that  poverty in developing  countries is on  This definition emphasizes  the development  related
the rise, estimating that the number of people with  actvities pursued by these agencies,  but offers little
inadequate diets in developing  countries (exduding  help in understanding  their fundamental nature.
China) increased from 650 million to  730 million  Prevailing analytic  dcassifications  reflect  the
between  1970  and 1980.  Decines are reported in life  reality that though social scientists from a number
expectancy,  per capita calorie supply,  and real wages  of disciplines  have studied NGOs, no social science
in the 1980s.3  The countries of Sub-Saharan  Africa  discipline  speciaes  in the study of this group of
experienced  an annual dccline of 2.9 per cent in per  organizations, in  the  sense  that  political science
capita income from 1980 to  1987.  Declines in real  specializes  in the study of governments  and econom-
per capita income were also experienced  during this  ics  specializes in  the  study  of  market-oriented
period by oil exporting and heavily  indebted count-  institutions. Consequently  more analytic work has
ries.!  been done and more conceptual  clarity exists about
It is little wonder that thoughtful development  the  public governmental and  private commercial
theorists and  practitioners are  searching for  new  sectors.
approaches  to dealing with Third World poverty. In  When social  scientists  do turn their attention to
this search, a  growing number of aid donors and  the  "residual' organizadons, they  are  inclined to
national governments have  turned  to  NGOs  as  apply analytical  perspecdives  that have been devel-
potential  instruments  for implementing  official  devel-  oped to  analyze the other  sectors. The following
opment projects, especially  those intended to chan-  brief characterizations of commonly applied pers-
nel public resources to the poor.  pecdves seek to  capture their  essential elements.
We share this interest in organizations that are  These perspectives  are useful and accurate, as far as
neither governmental  nor commercial and in their  they go.
distinctive  potentials  for support of national develop.
ment. We are concerned, however, that these org-  The I1n  of Economic  Analysis
anizations  are too often viewed  through conceptual
lenses that miss important aspects of their nature.  The  lens  of  economic analysis has  often  been
Their  developmental roles and  performance have  applied to explain why NGOs exist and what moti-
most often been assessed  through theoretical frame-  vates their behavior.  Economic analysis tends to
works  developed to  assess  organizations in  the  focus on the implications  of their non-profit status.
commercial and government sectors. The resulting  Of particular concern to the economist is the ques-
analysis  offers only a partial view that often leads to  tion of how the productive efficiency  of non-profit
working with  these  organizations in  ways  that  organizations differs from that  of  for-profit and
diminish rather than enhance their contributions to  governmental  organizations.
solving critical development  problems. In this essay
we will  propose a conceptual  lens for analyzing  such  Public Goods. One  common explanation for  the
agencies that offers a more complete and accurate  presence of  non-profit organizations parallels the
picture of their special development  roles.  economic  argument  for governments,  ie., economists
argue that certain "public  goods",  such as clean tir,
can be enjoyed  by everyone  once they are produced,
THE NGO: A RESIDUAL  CATEGORY  whether they have paid for them or not. Economists
note  that  there  is no  economic incentive for  an
The labels "non-profit and "non-governmental"  (we  individual  consumer to pay for products from which
will use these labels interchangeably  throughout this  others benefit equally at  no cost. This wfree  rider
section) say more about what the organizations so  problem  explains why  markets  seldom  produce
classified are  not than what they are. The terms  public goods, such as clean air, because the use of
define organizations that  are  residuals of  more  such goods cannot be restricted to those who pay
standard classificadons.  A  wide variety of diverse,  for them.
structurally and functionally  unrelated organizations  Governments,  in contrast, can use their power
fall  under  the  non-profit  and  non-governmental  to  tax and  regulate all citizens to  compel shared
category, as illustrated in Box 1.  support for producers of public goods. Provision  of
public goods is generally considered to  be one of
-2  -:.UOX  1: The  VlaiYtlat~  of:  RaldualO,S.  wpublic  goods.  In many  instances,  such  as the delivery
. .-.  . -:.-  .>...:  of medical or  chd  care,  their sric  may be
m  ;:..  '  indisti  haberf  tos  of a for-profit apncy.
tResldusr  Or9SfIZnuOn*  thfo  The  econlomifc  explallatoT for  such  non-profit
:Z0Stt  5t:;s  lb  ~  i~  -a  providers  is that when the quality  of the service
o  dG  clat ll  Int  i  Y  U  provided  is dfflt  to asses consmcrs will  prefer
lot  te  ItWy  Inch£id :aIns  dubs, par,  a non-profit  provider  that has less incentive  than a
t"chei  SSSOCISIIrW  noprci*t  :onit  for-profit  firm  to take advantage  of their igworancec
firms hlthdd  OSivnlttB, Sl*U5tfMOCIdIi.  A vaition  of the contract  failure  argument  sugsts
unel  lbbor.  sharin:ggop  peas  that purchasers  of services  (for example,  donors
f~s  village  ate  aons  'purchasing"  relief assisanc  from an NCO) wil
ulgu  oe  s  lh  prefer non-profits  if the services  are provided  to
-ckt  t  :b  tno  coi  other parties  with  whom  the donor is not in diret
btWIWIlSfltal advocacy grOUPS,  pow:tS P0~  contact and the  donor cannot directy eWaluate
milhiary  o  relgious schools,dvolun.  service  quality.  For example,  in development  work
tsp  fireaer ,  1  OflSWflOF  coosum  lve,  human  donors  can feel more confident  that their resources
rights  groups,  youth  c  dubs  . icy  anarySis  will be used by non-profits to benefit their intended
centers,, tenris  ns0clationa  sit  QSIlaIISB~  beneficiaries,  since  it is difficult  for the 'owners"  of
2lumn1  groups legal  aid so,letl~s,  Chambrs bit  a non-profit  to appropriate  surpluses.  A non-profit
COnWIISrC.  iabCx  fiseN,  vlca  ClUbs uch  -a  agency  like Oxfam  America  may  be seen by donors
Kiwaish  Fnd Atotauy,  looSi development  U-  as more likely to  deliver donations  to  intended
stolatloi@,  vteVrans groups.  tenants askola-  recipients than  a  for-profit agency that  might be
tlons, anmlt ShIt9tu. burial soc  prae  tempted  to convert  the donations  to profits.
clleg  hopitameiclit  , orphans.
gesa  asylUmS  temperane  support  - Coesuner  Con  Non-profits  may  also  be created
group.  su-h  -as Alctholbc Ainymous  by consumers  to achieve  greater control over the
-lelgi parert groups,,  private relief Org  W~la~  services rendered, thereby insuring quality and
owco"rlntch-ommitee,  avoiding  exploitation  by for-profit  agencies.  Thus
'-'  |  commuity  COfl~  marketing  or consumer  cooperatves  may  be desigp-
St.hnlc  associations retires lobby  group,  and  ed to reduce the capacity  of middlemen  to exploit
o  aorth.  - ;-monopsony  or monopoly  position9
;.Sonie  exist  to serve theiri  cwn meibetThe  above  are a  explanatios for the emer-
ates are  committd to:-  those  wh  gence  of non-profits  as a result  of various  forms  of
cannot help t_h...emse. -Soiper  W  - market failure. Market failure andlyses  ask what
vices.  Others offer mutual  support,  ngagin  niche  can be filled  by non-profit  organizations  that
publi` educatkn  a- a  cy  or pdv  is not served  by the for-profit  sector.  Markets  tend
chWIIY.  Some  are  cflC  :fled  Oniy  wit:h*:;  loto  be especially  vulnerable  to faiures in developing
iXEsses.  Others ate  s:td.  to  liltIofiSlor  countries 1 where large segmcnts  of the population
1nternational  ConCerns.  Some.  SUch  as  . Amnes-  lack the basic purchasing  power to participate,  so
ty Internaional.and  the Amerlcsn.C1VU  UbO  a  alternative  forms  of organizaion  that are remedies
V.Dort  pertor4~watch  dog  ~  ..................  ;for  market failures may be  particrlarly relevant
there.
In addition,  those who apply  the lens of econ-
the major  legitimate  functions  of government.  omic analysis  commonly  note that tax exemptions
But some segments  of the population  may  want  provide  non-profit  orgniation  with a competitive
more of the public  good than the government  is  advantage  in market situations  and that this ad-
willing to  provide. They can obtain additional  vantage  in itself  motivates  their formation  Govern.
quantities  through  a non-profit  agency  by conducting  ments  are often  understadably  concerned  that many
a  commity  dean-up campaign,  offering public  non-profits are  nothig  more than  commercial
education,  or pressing the government  for more  enterpries that use the bgal form of the non-profit
action.  The action  of the non-profit  orgnizaion in  to avoid  the tax collector.
such  instances  is explained  as a private  response  to
market  failure.  lhe  Len of Polltcal  ls
Corc  Fahu  Many non-profit organiaons  Much as economic  aalysis tends to focus on the
produce  servces that do not meet the definition  of  role of non-profit  orgnization  in  fiing  nicbes
-3 -created by  "market failure," the  lens  of  political  unlikely to  emerge  until  the  concept  has  been
analysis  tends to focus on their role in filling  miches  successully demonstrated, a  sort  of govermental
created by *government  failure," particularly  m the  innovator's Catch-22.
production  of public  goods. Political scientists  share  Non-governmental  agencies are less subject to
with  economists a  concern  with  the  free  ler  such political  pressures and thus are able to experi-
problem as a  major rationale for the existen  :l of  ment more easily than governments with politically
both government  and NGOs.  sensitive programs.  The  Ford  Foundation,  for
In general the tools of political  analysis assign  a  example, can take on  innovative projccts that  are
natural role to  NGOs in  the  provision of public  not  politically feasible for  the  US.  government.
goods that serve the needs of relatively  small groups  Likewise NGOs  elsewhere  may  test  innovative
that  can be  brought together in  face to  face or-  programs that  governments would not  undertake
ganizations.  The members of such organizations  are  until they are proven to be politically  feasible.  They
best able to see the results of their individual  con-  may also  act  as policy advocates of  these  same
tributions and the group is in  a  position to exert  innovations.
social pressures that minmize the free rider prob-  Political analysts have observed that vital non-
lem."' This focus on  the  small group leads to  a  governmental sectors  are  common  features  of
particular interest in  the role  of  NGOs in  local  pluralistic and  democratic political systems,' 5 and
development.' 2 that they are one of the first casualties of a shift to
Overall, the  political analyst finds  the  main  a  more authoritarian regime.6 This has important
arguments for the existence  of NGOs in the reality  implications  for our subsequent argument regarding
of social diversity  and in otherwise unmet needs for  the distinctive  nature and role of these organizations.
experimentation  and flexibility.
T-he  Donor Perspective
Social Diveay.  Societies are  characterized by a
wide variety of views of the  public good. In the  While the lens of economic  analysis  focuses  primari-
formulation of  consistent policies it  is  normally  ly on economic  efficiency  and incentives,  the political
necessary for governments  to  make choices among  analyst  emphasizes  the political  and institutional  role
these views. It  is difficult for  governments to  re-  of  NGOs.  Development donors  have  commonly
spond effectively  to  social diversity that  results in  chosen  to view NGOs through the lens of economic
different  constituencies making different  or  con-  analysis,  asking how the efficiency  and reliability  of
tradictory demands for government services.'3  For  NGOs compare with that of private contractors or
example, public policy in  the  U.S.  precludes the  government  in the provision of specified  services -
teaching of religion in the  schools. Those groups  in preference to  applying the lens of the political
that believe strongly that  religious teaching should  analyst.  The lens of the political  analyst raises issues
be integrated into the school curriculum have the  that donors have generally preferred to  ignore in
option of establishing their own schools to accom-  their desire to avoid being accused of meddling in
modate their need.  the internal politics of the countries they assist.
This  role of  non-profit organizations is  con-  Consistent with the choice of the economist's
sidered particularly  crucial in political  systems  where  lens, development  donors have generally concerned
the people are sovereign  but diverse - with compet-  themselves  primarily with NuOs  that might assume
ing and sometimes  contradictory  wills.  The response  roles in the implementation  of specific development
of the NGO, of course, is not limited to providing  projects  or in the transfer of financial  resources, ie,
the desired services. It might also engage in policy  with NGOs engaged in roles that would otherwise
advocacy and  political action  in  support  of  its  be assumed by governments,  private contractors,  or
preferred policy.  other organizations  with well defined  and understood
roles.
Egimeti  and Fe.dbifily. A widely  recognized  Donors have been  less attuned to  the  more
failure of large-scale government bureaucracies is  distinctive contributions of  NGOs  in  a  dynamic
their  inflexibility and  conservatism. Bureaucratic  society. This  is  an  important  oversight. These
rules and attention to procedures can be justified  for  distinctive  but neglected contributions include. their
reasons  of  equity and  accountability. But  these  roles as innovators  and advocates;  their contribution
institutional  characteristics  do not encourage flexible  to the balance of power between the state and civil
or innovative  responses  to novel problems.  Further-  society essential  to  a  dynamic economy and  a
more many governments  have  considerable  difficulty  participatory political system;' 7 their ability to tap
introducing  innovations before a degree of political  otherwise  inaccessible social  energ3r, and  their
consensus has  been  achieved. Such consensus is  capacity to link with one another  to become self-
- 4 -organi2zng  systems responsive  to a range of human  authort  in  hierarchical systems, negotiated  ex-
neets.  change in  market systems, and  shared  values in
We agree with the growing  list of observers  who  consensus-based  systems.  Table I summarizes  some
have  concluded  that the most important development  of  the  differences between  the  three  sectors so
roles  of  NGOs  are  organizatonal  and  political  defined.  These differences  will be discussed  in more
rather than fnancial and economic  '9 detail below.
Government organizations mobilize resources
through the mechanisms  of authority  and legitimate
THREE INSTITUMONAL  SECTORS  coercion,  consistent  with govermment's  primary role
of preserving social order and social controL This
It has been relatively  rare in development  cirdes to  patten  of  resource  mobilization is  particularly
treat NGOs as constituting  a sector with  a distinctive  evident in the power  to tax or the power to draft an
identity and features of its own.m This is in  fact  army, requiring individuals  to provide resources in
appropriate, as the  diverse collection of organiza-  spite of their preferences to the contrary.
tions classified  as NGOs does not define a sector in  Commercial organizations  carry out their tasks
a way that is very meaningfuL  of producing  goods and services through the mech-
anism of exchange.  They offer financial  incentives  to
Defining Three Sectors  gain access  to the materials, information,  and human
resources required for their activity.
It may be more helpfut to define the three institu-  Organizations in the voluntary sector, in con-
tional  sectors  as:  government, commercial, and  trast, mobilize  resources and social energy through
voluntary.  Each sector so defined has distinctive  and  the mechanisms of shared values and expectations.
conceptualy meaningfut characteristics.  Most people have some basic  values  - interpersonal,
The term "voluntar  refers here to actions  taken  religious, poli':ca  -- that  are  so deeply held that
by the free will of the actor. We will argue that  they will guide behavior  even in the face of counter-
voluntary organizations ("'VOs)  represent a  distinct  vailing coercivc sanctions or  %naterial  incentives
class of organizations that  depend on  energy and  These values can be invoked to mobilize  voluntary
resources given freely by their members and sr-.-  contributions  of labor, cash or kind to activities  that
porters,  because  they  believe  in  organizatio.4  give expression to these values. In  the context of
missions, not  because of  political imperatives or  coliective  action the contributor is rewarded both
econo,mic  incentives.  by the  satisfaction of reaffirming commitment to
Conceptually  we can define the three sectors in  passionately  held personal beliefs and by the fellow-
terms  of  the  three  primary options available to  ship of like-minded  colleagues.
organizations to  mobilize the  resources on  which  Shared values can be  powerful guides to  be-
their  function  depends: coercion  and  legitimate  havior because they offer actors a sense of efficacy
Table I: Sector Dilfferences
Commercial  Sector  Government  Sector  Voluntaq  Sector
Primary  Produce Goods  Preserve Social  Actualize
Concern  and Services  Order  Social  Visions
Implidt  Markets  Hierarchies  Clan/Consensus
Orzation
Coordination Negotiated  Authority and  Shared Values
Mechanisms Exchange  Coercion
Enforcement Contracts and  Supervision  Moral Obligation;
Mechanisms Reciprocity  Norms  and Rules  Professional  Ethics
Prototpe  Corporation  Army  Church
5-in molding  the world to fit a collectively  desired  constructive  sustainable improvements  in  human
vision.  Organized  action  to supplement  or counteract  well-being.  Defrung development  in  instits,tional
the activities  of govcermnt and commercial  or-  terms  helps to avoid  such  errors.
ganizations  often depends on mobilizing  resources  Financial transfers wiU have developmental
through such shared values. There is  growing  consequet-es only  if  institutional structures to
evidence  that the economists'  "free  ridere  hypothesis  manage  available  resources  effectively  are in place."
simply  does  not hold up well  empirically  people  do  The Marshal Plan in Europe and Japan, for ex-
in  fact contribute time, energy, and money to  ample,  was  successful  because  it channeled  resources
agencie seeking  to produce  public goods  even if  into  settingp  in which  the necessary  values,  skills  and
they receive  back less in material  terms than they  institutional  capacities  to use them were  basicaly  in
contribut&Y  place,  in spi'  of widespread  physical  destruction.
Conceptualy  the distinction  we are making  is  In the Third World,  by contrast,  development
quite simple.  The three sectors  focus  on different  assistance  has commonly  been fed into institutional
concerns  and employ  quite different  mechanisms  to  systems  devised  for feudal  or colonial  expropriation,
mobilize  resources  and human  energy.u  so new resources  are too often  converted  by elites
Empirically,  of course,  the world  is a good  deal  into current consumpticn  or capital flight.  Conse-
more complex than our  model suggests.  Most  quently,  the anticipated  economic  renaissance  has
organizations  have multiple  concerns  and utlize a  failed  to materialize  in many  countries.
variety  of mechanisms  to pursue them.  VOs utilize  Where  the necessary  values,  skills,  and institu-
fmancial  incentives  in the form of salaries  and they  tions for effective  resource  management  are not in
employ  hierarchical  authority  to guide  activities.  place, the developmental  impact  of financial  trans-
But we will  argue that true VOs are pna*  fers should  be assessed  largely  by their contribution
driven  by shared  values.  This distinction  is critical  to  to creating  them.
understanding  the development  potentials  of NGOs
that are truly  VOs.  Differentiating  Development  Roles
Note that not all NGOs  are VOs  by this defini-
tion. NGOs that are legally  nonprofit  but in fact  Now  we are ready to look at the natural  develop-
primarily  concemed with market and  financial  ment toles of each of the three sectors.
incentives  are better classifed  as commercial  agen-  Historically  in many  countries  government  has
cie4. NGOs that  are largely dependent on and  assumed  the primary  responsibility  for development
subordinate  to governmental  authorities  are better  leadership.  The distinguishing  characteristic  of the
understood  as part of the government  sector  in spite  government  sector  is its ability  to obtain  resources
of holding  a non-govermnental  legal  status.  Self-help  and compliance  through  authority  and legitimate  use
organizations  of the poor  are another  important  type  of coercion.  Legitimate  authority  and coercion  offer
of NGO, but  they are not necessarily  voluntary  effective  means  for accessing  existing  wealth.  If the
organizadons  by our definition.  We  will  elaborate  on  central  task of development  is to gain control  over
this later.  existing  financial  and physical  resources,  the govem-
ment sector must play a  very central role. But
Defining  Development  authority  and coercion  are more  limited  tools  in the
creation  of value added and in the promotion  of
We believe  that development  is most usefully  and  social  innovation.
accurately  defined  as:  The  commercial  sector  has the advantage  in the
efficient  production  of goods and services,  while
a process by whkh the members of a societ  voluntary  agencies  have  greater  potential  for  mobiliz-
develop themselves and their instutions  ing  voluntary  social  energies  and innovative  problem-
in ways that enhance their abilty to mobil-  solving.  Consequently  development  is difficult  to
ize and manage resource to produce sus-  achieve  in a society  in which  the state maintains
taiabk  and  stuy  disibuted  improve-  total dominion  over civil society.  While the state
mmn  in their quai  f life consistent with  must set the rules and the  framework,  it is ultimate-
their own aspatons.  ly the civil  society  that must drive  the development
process,  a  fundamental  truth now being acdnow-
We further  believe  that many  development  failures  ledged  even  in the U.SS.R. and China.
can be explained  as a consequence  of focusing  too  From  this  perspecdive,  the fact  that development
heavily on  the  financial transfer dimensions  of  analysts  have  turned  their attention  to the potentials
development  and neglecting  the institutonal and  of the commercial  sector  as an engine  of develop-
political transformation  dimensions  essential to  ment, after years of focus  on centralized  economic
-6-planning  and production  through  public  enterprise,  women's  movement,  and  the focus  of world  attention
is  an  important advance. Much of  the  current  on population.  These efforts have changed  global
concern with  privatization,"  for example,  can be  pereeptions  and  policies on  fundamental  social
understood  as an effort  to separate  the functions  of  issues.
the commercial  and the govermmental  sectors  so that  In a world dominated  by the government  and
each sector  may  perform  those tundions  for which  commercial  sectors,  VOs thcmselves  may lose  sight
it is best suited.  of the centrality  of values  to their  cistence. In their
But the development  task is not limited  simply  quest to  strengthen their funding base through
to increasing  the value of economic  transactions,  proving  their professionalism  many  VOs  have  been
which is what GNP measures.  Development  has  inclined  to deny  their voluntarism,  which  some  have
failed  unless  thv society  has increased  its capacity  to  come  to view  as an embarrassment  - though  it is in
transform  available  resources  into justly  distributed  fact their distinctive  asset. If VOs are to rcalize
improvements  in human  well-being.  their  full  potential  as a distinctive  developmer  force
The commercial  sector  has  evident  advantages  in  it is important  that they  become  morc  self-co-  's
pursuit  of market  induced  innovations  that increase  regarding  the contrality  of values  and voluntL  so
the value of economic  transactions.  However,  the  their distinctive  na:ure  and role.
innovations  that insure that these  increases  in value
are translate' into  justly  distributed  improvements  in
well-being  must normally  come either  from govern-
ment  or from  the voluntary  set ir. Between  the two,  BOX  2: The Role of NGO In:U.S.  Develop
VOs have important  advant&,s over goverrnent  mant
organizations  as catalysts  of the types  of social  and
institutienal  innovation  required.  NGOs  played  an  importInt  roe  n U.S.  dov
Governments  depend for their function  on a  OpUent From the firSt  day-of  Its  birth  a. a
broadly  based political  consensus  fashioned  through  fEW ntbi: 
negotiation and  compromise among numerous
existing  power holders and  interest groups. Their  6olh  ilwh  knd  QIIOSIO *  Ot.
ability  to innovate  is constrained  by the n.:cessity  of  *
first  achieving  a reasonably  broad  consensus,  at least  .p ....
among  key power holders  who may have a  substan-
tial  commitment  to maintaining  existing  inequitien.  T  eto  ewn  In the.
The constituencies  of VOs are generally  much  1885  to1,  n  t  eu
smaler tan  those of governments  and are built  h  i  - poo.  &
around a more coherent  values  consensus.  Conse-
quently, in comparison with government,  the VO is  9  bwlnasdp  *au  *t  f;
able to define positions more clearly,  to press for  1tni*i  ,  _  s  l  _Na-
innovative  solutions,  and to experiment  in ways  that  1
governments  find difficult.  This gives  VOs a disdnc-  un  r  -Oa  sf
tive role as catalysts  of system  change  in dcfning,  il  s,  no  ftn  ie
articulaing, and advocating  positions  that are outside  ...  4
the established  political  mainstream  and therefore  ~~~. 
not supported  by existing  publihc  policy.  t  or  n
Driven by values rather than by the  quest for  av
economic  or political  power,  it is also natural  that
many  VOs  focus  their attention  on the needs  of the  '  ..  ............ ;.
poor and disenfranchised  more naturally  than do  p  .
governments.  In countries  with a mature voluntary
sctdor,  VOs are constantly  callng attention  to and  IdtIUi  a  . ~aoihdpvty~
acting  on perceived  opportunities  for improving  the  ..... i.f
well-being  of the society's  members.  the  dtd  W
The voluntary  sector  role in socilI  innovation  is  t  .at  .fj  l
far more varied  and pervasive  than its commonly  d  S  tWdthIdWt
recognized  role in implementing  pilot piroject for  01.
replication  by  governments  and donors  For example,
Vos have had a leading role in creating  the cil  Fra  tKW  t  o  Oiier.
rights  movement,  the environmental  movement,  the  np  t  .
-7 -Plualsm  and the Volrntaa Stw  VOLUNTARY  ENERGY  AS A DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCE
Our definition  of developn.,  nt focuses  attention  on
distributive  justice as a major development  issue.  Voluntary  energy is an  almost wholly neglected
This  recognizes  that poverty  is as much  a political  as  development  resource. It is the life force of the
it is an economic  condition.  In many  Third World  VO. It is important  that we better understand  its
societies the achievement  of broadly based sus-  nature and application.
tainable  development  depends  on achieving  a more
broadly  based distribution  of economic  and political  Specl  Characteristkcs  of Voluntary  Energ
power,  %hile  simultaneously  strengthening  incentives
and values  that support  the use of that power to  Voluntary  energy has several characteristics  that
make productive  use of availablc  resources.  This  disiguish it from  the energy  generated  by  financial
necessarily  requires strengthening  the role of the  exchanges  or governmental  authority.  These  charac-
civil  society  vis a vis the state. It must be recog-  teristics  are important  to the role of the voluntary
nized  in turn that democratic  pluralism  is a sinc qua  sector  in development.
non for a strong  and dyhamic  civil  society.  First, voluntary  energies  are low cost, at least
The vuluntary  sector has a  specal  role in  in financial  and political  terms  and exist  in potential-
contributing  to the development  of pluralistic  civil  ly inexhaustible  quantities.  Many  powerful  voluntary
societies  and in the awakening  of a socially  con-  movements  do not have  access  to large amounts  of
scious  work  and investment  ethic.  Indeed,  these  may  rinancial  capital  or political  power-indeed,  part of
wetl  be the sector's  most important  and distinctive  their appeal may be  their relative poverty and
development  roles.  powerlessness,  as in Gandhi's  Ladependence  move-
The grassroots  organizing  work that is central  ment. This is not to say that voluntary  movements
to the agendas  of many  Third World VOs is an  do not need financial  and political  resources;  they
important  contributor  to democratization  and to the  do. But their lifeblood  is in their aippeal  to values  to
strengthening  of civil  society.  It facilitates  the break-  which people will commit  energy,  time and often
down of residual feudalstic structures  and value  their lives.
systems  by realigning  power  structures  and improv-  Second,  voluntary  energies  are not easiy con-
ing access  of  the actual producer to  productive  golled by the mechanisms  usel to  control  other
resources.  Producer  organizations  in turn reinforce  forms of  social energy. Furthermore, they are
new  values  that support  socialy  conscious  productive  difficult  if not impossible  to  buy and cannot be
work  and investment.  stored.  Leadership  by appeal to values  demands
In their political  role,  VOs supplement  political  skills different from those learned in market or
parties  as mechanisms  through  which  citizens  define  bureaucratic  organizations.  Although some public
and articulate  a broad range  of interests  and make  and private  leaders develop  charismatic  leadership
demands  on government.  In their educational  roles  styles  that serve them well in mobilizing  voluntary
they provide  training  grounds  for democracy,  de-  energies,  others are mystified  by the demands  of
velop  the political  skills of their members,  recruit  mobilzing and  guiding voluntary  energies. Not
new poltical leaders and stimulate political  par-  surprisingly,  voluntary  energy  has proven  to be a
ticipation.  In their  watchdog  role they  serve,  as does  development  resource  largely  inaccessible  to develop-
the press,  as checks  on what Diamond  refers to as  ment planners,  bureaucrats  and technicians.
...  the relentless  tendency  of the state to centralize  Third,  voluntary  energies  may  be subject  to self-
its  power and to  evade civic accountability  and  reinforcing  escalaion. National and international
contzoL"'  social  movements  can grow  from minuscule  begin-
The importance  in  the  development  of  the  nings,  as most of the world's  major religions  illus-
United States of both VOs and, what we will  trate. Norman Uphoff has argued that the com-
describe later as, people's organizations  is sum-  bination  of shared values,  new ideas about  how to
marized in Box 2. Although  many of the initial  accomplish  common  goals,  and new friendships  can
activities  of VOs in the US. were essentNliy  chari-  interact to  produce a  self-regenerating  positive
table, many VOs also undertook  activides  with  escalation  of social  energies  with  wide  impact.  He
cubstantial  pohtical  and economic  imphcations  and  offers  the example  of a Sri Lankan  irrigaton  system
had important  roles in the creation  of other institu-  rehabilitation  project  in which  the voluntary  energy
tions needed  to respond  to unmet social  needs.  of participating  farmers  astonished  the project or-
ganizers  and led to development  activity  far beyond
expectatons.
-8-There are, however,  also inwtances  of negative  One recent comparison of work force charac-
reinforcement  cydes  that  produce  "burnout  of  teristics in the three  sectors in the  United States
voluntary  energies  and a failure of enduring commit-  found  that  voluntary sector  employees reported
ment. More understanoing  of the circumstances  that  significantly  more meaning in their jobs and  sig-
lead either to positive  or to negative reinforcement  nificantly fewer experiences in which job  require-
cycles  in the generation of voluntary  energy is badly  me,nts violated their consciences. They also were
needed.  paid two thirds as much. The authors of the study
concluded:
Voluotary  Energy  in Public  and Commercial  Sectors
..third sector employees  bring to their jobs
The importance  of voluntary  energy is not limited to  a  greater  commitment and  nonmonetary
the voluntary  sector. Public and commercial  agencies  orientation  and find  more challenge,  variety,
may also seek to mobilize  voluntary energies in the  and  autonomy in their jobs and more in-
service of government or corporate goals.  fluence, and, perhaps,  mystique in,  their
Much of the literature on "excellent  companies"  work  roles. Nonprofit workers also  find
is focused on how to develop mstrong  cultures  that  more intrinsic rewards in their jobs. The
mobilize  employee  values and goals in the service of  majority would prefer to continue in their
company strategies. 3 present work. 30
Similarly,  many governments seek to  mobilize
the voluntary commitments of their citizens in the  The  dominance of  value-based motivation in  the
service  of public goals. When governments  are seen  voluntary  sector has implications  for leaders of VOs.
as  legitimate and  the  goals are  consistent with  Leadership  based on hierarchical  authority or finan-
popular concerns, enormous outpourings of energy  cial incentives  is less likely to be effective  in VOs
may result. For example, thousands of young Iran-  than  leadership grounded  in  shared  visions and
ians went forth to fight the Iraqi invasion;  thousands  adherence to common norms. There  is a  growing
of  idealistic young Americans joined  the  Peace  body of research on the characteristics  of the charis-
Corps in response to Kennedy's  calL  When govern-  matic leader who appeals to the values and visions
ment actions are not seen as legitimate, the same  of his or her followers.  This research concludes  that
energies may be  turned  against them,  as  in  the  leaders who are able to articulate shared visions  and
United States when large segments  of the population  mobilize their  foilowers around  them  are  more
actively resisted the  Viet  Nam War  and  in  the  successful than  others  in  sparking high levels of
Philippines  when election fraud led the people to  performance  in individuals,  teams and even national
oust their government.  governments. 3!
Mobilizing  Voluntary Energy  Organizing  Around Shared Values
While in practice most organizations  utilize several  Organization to  use  voluntary energy  effectively
approaches  to  mobilizing and  organizing  their  requires stru tures and processes  in some ways  quite
resources, they often depend on  one approach as  different  from  those  familiar  in  other  sectors.
primary. Thus Etzioni argued almost three decades  Recent conceptual analyses suggest that there may
ago that organizations  could be divided into three  be  organizational forms that  are  particularly ap-
types quite similar  to the sector descriptions  we have  propriate to different forms of social energy. The
proposed. In his typology,  utilitarian organizations,  analyses of  'transactions costs  theorists, for  ex-
like commercial firms, promise material rewards to  ample, have identified  three fundamentally  different
their  members  in  exchange for  their  calculaive  patterns  of  organization that  are  efficient under
involvement;  coercive  organizations,  like prisons and  different conditionsY2
armies,  secure  alienating  involvement  through
coercive  control;  normative  organizations,  like  a  Markets  are highly efficient for  making deci-
churches  or social  movements,  mobilize  members for  sions provided certain assumptions about com-
moral  involvement through  shared  values  and  petition and  information availability  are  met.
normsY  The mechanism  of price provides  a coordination
If VOs in fact mobilize people around shared  mechanism;  decisions  are made through negotia-
values, we would expect the  members of VOs to  tions about prices; agreements are formalized  in
see their jobs in quite different  terms from members  contracts and if necessary  enforced through the
of primarily  commercial or governmental  organiza-  court system.
tions. There is evidence that they do.
9.*  Hierwdchies,  in contrast, are efficient organiza-  dividuals  who carry and interpret the values of the
tional forms when the assumptions  of a friction-  organization,  providing  it with its energy,  continuity,
less market are invalid. Formal authority is the  and direction. This is the group that will be found
fundamental coordination  mechanism in hierar-  working nights and weekends, that  stays with the
chies; decisions are  made  or  legitimated by  organization through good times and bad. In addi-
commands;  authority can be formalized  in rules  tion  there  may  be  a  parallel system, comprised
and procedures and assigned responsibilities  of  perhaps  of  the  administrative and  possibly the
individuals.  Hierarchies are  particularly useful  operational personneL that performs somewhat like
when the transactions  costs of repeated negotia-  a  conventional  bureaucracy. This system is staffed
tions  in  an  imperfect market  outweigh the  with persons who have been attracted  to  the or-
administrative  costs of creating and maintaining  ganization as a source of employment and have a
a bureaucratic hierarchy.  conventional  exchange  relationship  with it, remaining
so long as the pay and benefits are more attractive
*  Clans are  organizatonal forms that are  ccor-  than alternative offers.
dinated by shared values and norms rather than  The  Rural  Development Trust,  for  example,
authority  or price mechanisms.  Decisions  in such  hires  many village level workers whose primary
organizatons are grounded in consensus about  reason for joining the  agency is employment and
values and goals; expectations  are enforced by  regular pay. In return for employment  these workers
"moral obligations" or professional ethics. Clan  are expected to follow  the dictates of authorities in
organization  has higher costs in terms of sociali-  the organizational  hierarchy. Yet at  the top of the
zation of its members for  agreement on core  RDT organization is a leadership group, the mem-
values and expectation,  but they cope efficiently  bers of which are committed to a  common vision,
with  market imperfections  that would  undermine  are  the carriers of  the organization's values, and
markets and  with task  uncertainties and  am-  remain  with the organization  to pursue that vision  in
biguities that  would overwhelm bureaucratic  spite of opportunities for more pay in other agen-
hierarchies.  cies. So long as members of the  leadership team
maintain  the  organization's  value  commitment,
Clan forms  of organization  are equipped to innovate  opportunities presented  to  the  organization for
in the face of high levels of uncertainty and am-  increased  funding and political power will be reject-
biguity.  Their members are integrated around shared  ed if acceptance would threaten the organization's
understandings  of the organizational  mission,  so they  core vision of empowering  the rural poor.
can adjust their behavior to fit changing  conditions-
-rather than follow  outdated rules and procedures.
There are drawbacks to value driven organiza-  VOLUNTARY  ORGANIZATIONS  AND
tions. Experience  in voluntary  development  organiza-  DEVELOPMENT
tions indicates that the value commitments  that are
their strength can also be the source of considerable  Generally the  VOs  of  concern  to  development
difficulty. Disagreements within value-driven or.  donors have been those engaged in such functions
ganizations are  easily  interpreted  in  ideological  as:
terms, for example,  and so lead to explosive  internal
and  external  conflicts that  can  disintegrate the  . Disaster relief for people suffering  fromfamine,
agency.33  drought, war, and other natural and man-made
A Mix of Values and  Strucres  catastrophes.
a  Provision  of senices  such as health care, family
It  is  worth  re-emphasizing that  most  effective  planning,  agricultural  extension and crediL
organizaeions  in any sector will use a mix of values
and structure to  motivate and  coordinate the  ac-  a  Comnmuniy  oranizing  technical  and education-
tmities  of their members. Whle  VOs are organized  al assistance to enable local groups to organize,
around and centrally dependent on values for the  solve local problems, and influence other agen-
definition  of core activities and the mobilization  of  cies to provide better services.
key resources, most also make use of authority and
exchange  as well.  *  Grant making to people's organizations  and to
In  some VOs  it  is  possible to  identify two  service  provider and community  organizing  VOs.
distinct systems that  operate  side  by  side. One
represents a  sort  of leadership core  of those in-
- 10  -*  Traning  and  technical assista3ce support  to  Some VOs, such as Oxfam America, have a
other VOs performing  development  functions.  clear commitment  and approach to diagnosing  local
institutional capacities and  to  working to  support
*  Research  and  infomnation xchange  for  the  and build these capacities rather than focusing on
formation  of development  policies  and programs.  relieving  immediate symptoms  of the problem. Yet
many VOs that  deliver services needed in a  local
*  Netwoddng  for  experience sharing, program  setting, such as medical  assistance  or education,  find
coordination  and joint ation  on sector issues.  that it is easier to provide the needed services than
to build local capacity.
*  Development education to increase public and  Sustainability  and accountabilit  to benefiiary
opinion  leader understanding  of key  development  populations are  critical concerns in  assessing the
issues.  appropriateness of  service delivery arrangements.
Sustainabiliq requires building systems  with reason-
*  Advocacy  in support of critical  policy  and institu-  ably secure sources of ongoing resource support,
tional changes.  such service fees or access to public finances  raised
in  the  jurisdiction served. Accountability can be
Our experience  suggests  that the order in which  this  achieved through  developing competing fee  for
list is presented roughly coincides  with the allocation  service providers that offer the consumer a choice,
of donor resources to VOs under foreign assistance  or  through governance structures that  allow the
programs. in  other  words, disaster relief receives  serice  users  to  hold  sctiice  providers directly
substantially  more donor funding  than any other VO  accountable  - for  example,  parents  electing  a
activity,  advocacy  receives the least.  governing  board that hires the teachers for the local
AU of the above activities  involve international  schooL
assistance. However, not  all  can  be  considered  Where the  services are  funded by a  foreign
developmental  by the terms of our definition. For  donor and  delivered through an  organization that
the same reason, not all VOs assisted by donors are  has no accountability  to beneficiaries  it is difficult  to
properly classed as development  agencies.  establish that the tests of sustainability  and accoun-
tability have been met.
Service  versus Development  Catalyst Orpnlzations  Foreign voluntary relief and service organza-
tions can  have developmental impacts when they
There is an important distinction between welfare  make explicit efforts to  create local capacities to
and development  interventions that is important in  support  or  provide  services that  can  be  locally
distinguishing between  voluntary service delivery  sustained.  They are not development  agencies  when
organizations and  voluntary development catalyst  their impact is to create continuing dependence on
organizations.  themselves by the populations they serve or when
they compete so successfully  with local institutions
Vohwtwy  Sernce  Delivery Oriations.  Many  that they in effect destroy local capacity for self-
organizations  that provide disaster relief and welfare  reliance.
services  in  developing countries  are  organized
around shared  values and visiOnS,  often tracing  their  Dewlopment Catawst Oganiations.  Thirty Asian
roots  to  religious traditions.'  VOs  that  deliver  NGO  leaders  who  met  in  Bangkok under  the
disaster relief or social services perform important  auspices  of the Asian NGO Coalition  in March 1988
social functions,  but unless they are developing  the  to  discuss issues of  NGO  strategy focused their
capacity  of indigenous  organizations  to replace them  attention on  the  importance of  VOs workimg  as
in  these functions on  a  self-sustaining  basis after  development  catalyst  organizations  defined as
their  departure  they  cannot  claim  to  be  doing
development work  Where  these  are  foreign or  oo  that use temporay  intenven-
foreign  funded VOs they may unintentionally  be  "ons  to promote  the creon  of sustanabk
creating an anti-developmental  dependence.3  loca-ccountable  stitions  that  in-
In  the  case  of  disaster relief agencies, it  is  prove the quaty  of life.
clearly  difficult  in the midst of a catastrophe to work
seriously on building local systems to  respond to  Development catalyst  VOs differ substantialy from
future crises. However, m other  than  emergency  VOs that undertake to  deliver services for an in-
situations, attention  should be  given to  a  more  determinate period. The role of the  development
developmental  approach that reduces dependence  on  catalyst is  temporary. Its  actions are  directed to
foreign charity.  catalyzing  changs  that produce self-dieding, self-
- 11 -Ur 3. Dwtopmstt Catalyst  e"OrganlUon:  donor's  lack of understanding  of the VO catalyst's
"S  iaijdl  basic  nature and function.
First, the catalyst  VO is neither  a government
Soils ManJi: le  -voluntary  organzation that  dependency  nor a business.  So unless a donor is
wOr-s  W  ith  small  fnrmers  bn rural vilages ln  sufficiently  generous  to give it an endowment  to
mdIi..L:  in  the. late: $aventI  village: workers  fund its operations in perpetuiy, the VO necessarily
b..ame  frIstrated  with-the minima  IWpct  of  depends  on a continuing  flow  of external  contribu-
training mail  farmers.ln  agr1lcuturml  mods.  tions from donors  willing  to allow  it the indepen-
Wlththeal  -*id-.  an  outside  consulant Fey  dence and autonomy essential  to  carfying out its
loia  program  tolp  famr  leaders  mission.
.and  village  groups anayze thekairIcurstancesia  Second, the true catalyst  VO performs tem-
plan  InitIatIve  and  organizeSthemseles  collec-  porary functions.  For this reason there is no in-
to:  arry o  their plans.  herent contradiction  between its reliance on external
Te  farm.r groW  ps became wetreely actie,  funding  and its commitment  to sustainability  - as
ng  'caly  chosen projects like buld.  long as it maintains  its independence  in defining  its
.ig  chools,  reducing  vlllage  alcohol  consump-  agenda  and strategy.
tilon demanding  more attention from agricul  The task of the catalyst  Vo is to build self-
tS  ext6nn-agents,  and  building coa1Ions  reliant sustainable institutions that are accountable
Etol:el:t  fW  repese  t  to local govern  to the people,  rather  than to become  self-reliant  and
mennt-  bodles. The -results of the  wodrhops  sustainable itself. The concern of the donor there-
nd villagefollowup actvties  were 8so  suc  fore should  be not with  whether  the catalyst  VO is
cesefuiJthat  ... ,So:  a  Mandir staff  soon  began  itself becoming financially self-reliant so  much as
applying  it hi dozen  dof  other villaes,  with whether it is effectively  developing  self-reliant
self-sustaining  organizations and structures able to
Sotibee  RaJesh Taridon and  LDavid  Brown,  survive  its own  departure.
:ranzatlor-Buildlng  for Rural Development:  Effective performance in the  catalyst role re-
AnEXpeimet  'in India. JJourna  ApiWed  quires that  the VO  maintain substantial indepen-
BeheMru  $cfce.  :17:Z 1981,  -pp.172-189.  dence  in defining  and interpreting  its own  mission  so
that  it does not fail captive to  power holders in
government  or business  who see their interests  as
financing  local institutional  arrangements  that can  better served  by maintaining  the status quo.  At the
survive  its departure.  See Box  3 for an example  of  same time, its  survival and  effectiveness  often
a development  catalyst  organization.  requires  that it maintain  credibility  and legitimacy
Some  VOs that believe  themselves  to be catal-  with a  wide variety of  external constituencies,
ysts  are surprised  to realize  on reflection  that they  including  donors.  Effective  development  catalyst  VOs
are not. Even VOs committed  to organizing  local  become  adept at articulating  visions  and values  that
communities  for  empowerment  and  self-reliance  strike resonant  cords among  diverse  external  con-
often find they have unintentionally  allowed  the  stituencies,  as well  as in their own members.
beneficiary  groups to become dependent  on them
for services  such as credit or health. Such depen-  Voluntuy Sector  Support and Networking
dence is increasingly  being  recognized  by VOs as  Orpinatlons
counter-developmental.
Development  catalyst  VOs face constant  pres-  As the voluntary  sector  matures  in a given  country,
sures from donors to move into welfare  oriented  there is normally  an increasing  differentiation  of
service  delivery  roles that may compete  with their  functions  among  its component  organizations,  some
distinctive  catalytic  functions.  Service delivery  is  of which undertake  to become specialized  service
easier,  produces  results more quicldy,  and is more  providers  either to other members  of the sector  or
likely to please donors who want their resources  to people's  organizations.  Similarly  growing  numbers
matched with clearly measurable outputs. Both  of networks  will  emerge.
donors and catalyst  VOs must be alert to these
forces  and attempt  to resist them.  Sector  Support  Ogewi4dos.  These  organizations
Another dilemma posed for the catalyst  VO by  provide  technical  assistance,  training,  research,
well-meaning  donors is the expectation  that they  advocacy  support,  and other services  to VOs that
should demonstrate  their ability to  become self-  can not allocate  resources  away  from their primary
financing The expectation  commonly  reflects the  activities  to create  in-house  expertise.  As the volun-
tary sector  grows  in size  and complexity,  increasing
- 12 -Bz  4s.  Supporti  Or:  nization:  Societo  for  interest  is emerging  members  of some  VO networks
orll  46acrch In As  (RIA).-  in defining  shared visions  to which  they can apply
their individual  resources in mutually  supportive
PRIA Ii Sfl NGO that provides jpartlclpatrY  ways in pursuit of national development  agendas
rMWch, tItftinlflg  andconsulting suppom  to  that would  be impossibk  for any  single  member  or-
*  wida range  df  aess|ltOs  nilonar  g  hn  ganization  to attempt.
Indbiaand  AsIa$bhts  staff  members  typicafly  hav  Some networks  attempt to link al  voluntary
kgrouneds inl community organizing  and  agencies  within a country or geographic region. An
MUM  Ot fields;:  and  they work In half a  example  is the Association  of Development  Agencies
do  se'  raing  ro  w  deM  of Bangladesh  (ADAB)  described  in Box  5.
*  -ont  to-  t  litery  tfO  wasteland  reclama.  Other  networks are  organized around specific
:ion,  m  .....  -:;..::.-:.=issues  or aras  of joint interest The International
.PRI has  pieed  te  theoy  and  prac-  Council  on Adult Education  (ICAE), for example,  is
ropad  rch anIld  ctll,uad  an association  of regional  and national  associations
d:  hi  -o9peration  with  rassroots  that includes  the adult
NGQ  -way  of diagnosing  and  solving thelr  education and literacy  associations of Africa, Asia,
problems  ofO-aizat  and  fafaee  and  Latin  America  as  members. ICAE  World
The- agency has- developed a  program of  Assemblies  are occasions  at which  adult educators
educating NGO staf.*Wf  Ixperiential  training  from all over the world share experience,  learning
methodologies adapted  to- rral  organizin  and support.
woc  PiRIA  staff iave  also  utuiiid  their ex-  While these associations seldom speak  for  a
perlenc  to dsveop  manuals  and literature on  very integrated  constituency,  they do serve as impor-
parWatory  niZing.  Through  linkages  with  tant channels  for the diffusion  of ideas and tech-
simlar .IntdtutI6ns: n  other  countrs  these  nologies for  local  development  initiatives  The
materils have received wordwide dissemina-  "participatory research" movement,  for  example,
tkn,  which has advocates  and practitioners  on virtualy
evcry continent, has grown largely out of networks
inspired by ICAE and its membe&'3
numbers  of such specalized  organizations  can be
expected to emerge to serve its growing  needs. In
India, for example,  the growth of the voluntary  BoK  5. Voluntary  Netwolrk:  -Assoclo  f
sector has rea&rd  the point where it requires the  Development  -Agencies  oft  B. ng3ladih
support of  many high quality technical service  (ADAB)
organizations,  such as PRIA. See Box 4.
ADAB  includes the major vnuntar  deop-
Networks.  Networks are self-help support systems,  ment agencies working in Banglade`h among
commonly  with secretariats that provide  services  for  Its tmmibership. in early 1988 fte  chliie  .-
their members  similar to  those provided by  the  tives of the largest dozen  merber8:od  ADAB
sector support organizations described above. But  came  together  to  discuss  the  developmen
unllke other sector support organizations  the net-  situation  In the country and thf  p  sf
work  secretariat  is commonly  responsible  to a board  the future.  Although-  the-agencs  had a hW  oy
that  represents  the  members  the  secretariat  is  of-some conipedtion  and jealoiUsy t  h,It
intended to  serve. Most rnetworks  also have the  eoxtetues  weret somewhit stard  ind
specific  function of linking together like-minded  themselves i  essenti  agreement about th
organizations  to share information,  plan joint ac-  bleak prospecs for future deveil.'PM
tivities,  and make a  united response to  political  Outoad  this,m eIn  :::mergdanAh  -:.
pressures  from governments  and the demands  of  ml:  that U1  ih9e pat  th 
international  development agencies.  ment  In Bangladesh depided  othbt
As  development catalyst VOs  become more  t  ldless  peoia  organiopmt
concereed  about the sustainability  of local  develop-  by.thevarious NGOC  to'.  link:  o  i-.
ment initatives, they also become more conscious  of  otions  capable  f  ng  n  l  e
the  detrinental consequences  of  many existing  and -politIcal  influence.  They aged  td  begi
development  policies  and insitutons and the need  exprlefitlng  in  eetdirc  iththe
for  coliective  advocacy  efforts. This is  leading  promotion  of landless  feratdi  w
network  organizations  and associations  to take on  long term end of enablin  w  d4
increasingly  important  roles. For example,  a  new  eMtlon  among peopleog  n
- 13 -OTHER TYPES  OF SOCLi1 ACTION  NGOS  they are committed -- as is true of many socially
progressive  for-profit  businesses.  Many also operate
As indicated  earlier,  there are a variety  of NGOs  of  on the basis  of high ethical  standards  -- as again  do
interest to development  donors  that are not VOs.  many  for-profit  businesses.
Two types bear  special  mention: puolic service  However, the VO is likely  to be  more cleauly
contractors;  and people's  organizations.  focused  than the PSC  in the pursuit  of its particular
social  mission.  It is more  likely  to challenge  conven-
PubUc  Service  Contactots  tional  practice  and to be openly  critical  of govern-
ment and of public  policy.  It will  be more selective
Maz-y  NGOs  are highly  market  oriented,  evaluating  iL its choice  of funding  sources,  attempting  to limit
their 9verall  performance  on such criteria  as total  its reliance  on donors  that might  redirect  its mission.
funding  level  and market  shares of particular  tyes  It will  strive  to accept  contracts  only  when  they  offer
of fund&g.  Though  non-profit,  they  function  largely  a clear opportunity  o advance  its own mission
as  businesses within the  development  industry,  We will  look more closely  at the issues  raised
selling  services  to governments  or private donors,  by the PSC in a latter secion.
much  as firms  in the US. that accept  contracts  from
government  to provide  a range  of municipal  services  PeopWs  Ogdzantions
from  garbage  collection  to health  delivery.  We  refer
to these or6utizations  as public  service  contractors  People's  organizations  (POs)  are commonly  cassified
(PSCs).  as NGOs.  They represent  a special  form of NGO
The more competitive  PSCs feature  substantial  that differs  from both VOs and PSCs in ways  that
technical  competence,  elaborate  management  sys-  make  them  of special  importance.  For an organiza-
tems, and  concern with cost efficiency.  Where  tion to qualify  fully  as a PO it must meet three
resources  are available  they may operate on con-  criteria:
siderable  scale.
It is important to address PSCs as a  special  *  It  must be self-rliw  in that its  continued
category  of NGO,  because  they  often  represent  what  existence  must not depend  on outside  initiatve
donors are really seeking  when they contract  with  or funding.
NGOs  for advisory  services  and project  implementa-
tion.  It is important  for donors  that want  a contrac-  *  It must be a mual  bene  associaton in that
tor type of service  to be aware  of the difference  it exists  to serve  its members.
between VOs and  PSCs, both  to  increase the
chances  they  will  get what they  want,  and to reduce  *  It must have  a democwc sttuctu  that gives
the chances  that they will  treat a VO like a PSC  its members  ultimate  authority  over its leaders.
and unintentionaly  reduce  its ability  to function  in
its distinctive  VO role.  The  fundamental  importance  of  strong POs in
Conceptually  the difference  between  a VO and  maintaining  the dynamism  of a  society  has been
a  PSC is clear. A values-driven  VO defines its  demonstrated  throughout  history,  even  in the early
program  based  on its social  mission,  and then seeks  pre-industrial  empires.  A series  of studies  by Unger
the funding  required  to implement  it. The market-  concluded  that periods  of decline  in the great pre-
driven  PSC stats with an assessment  of prospective  industrial  empires  were triggered  by the success  of
funding  sources  and defines  its program on that  elites  in gaining  control  over  peasant  land  and labor.
basis.  This control  enabled  them to reduce smallholders,
In reality  it is sometimes  difficult  to distinguish  independent  tenants and wage  laborers  to serfs on
between  the VO and the PSC,  particularly  as NGOs  great estates. According  to  Unger, empires that
come  to rely  heavily  on government  support,  and as  avoided decline were characterized  by  vigorous
a growing  number  of VOs establish  PSC units or  independent  local  organizations  of farmers  who  were
affiliates  as a means  of generating  income  for their  sufficiently  politically  conscious  and organizationally
VO work  in response  to donor interest  in contract-  skilled to engage in collective  self-defense  against
ing with  NCOLs.  these  ultimately  self-defeating  and anti-developmen-
The PSC may  in many  respects  look much  like  tal forces  of social  oppression.37
a VO in its structure  and its formal  statement  of  As development  catalyst  VOs articulate  their
purpose and have the same type of legal regis-  visions,  they  commonly  define  as one of their central
tration. Many  PSCs combine  a market orientation  tasks the empowerment  of  people through the
with a social commitment  and have  mission  state-  formation  of grassroots  organizations  to assume  key
ments that emphasie the social  agenda  to which  economic  and political  roles in improving  their own
- 14 -situations,  including  exerting  influence  over  decisions  with and through  POs as a means  of benefiting  the
of other agencies  -- public  and private  - that affect  poor may  find that investments  must first be made
them. An increasing  number  of the more visionary  in their institutonal  development.  Such  developmen-
VOs see this work  as part of a larger commitment  tal investments  are usually  best made  through  VOs.
to democratizing  the economic  and political  struc-  Governmenl  efforts  to promote  the development
tures oi their societies.?  of POs usually  produce  something  quite different.
POs are training  grounds  for democratic  citizen-  An organization  may be formed,  but its leadership
ship and institutional  building  blocks  for the demo-  will more likely  be accountable  to the government
cratization  of otherwise  authoritarian  societies.  They  than to its members,  and its existence  is likely  to
are  a  means of broadening the distribution  of  depend  on a continued  flow  of government  patron-
political  and ecenomic  power  that most  development  age.
catalyst  VOs believe  is an essential  step to more  In many  countries  it is becoming  dear that for
broadly-based  development  participation.  They  create  village  level POs to become truly effective  as an
demands  for greater responsiveness  to grassroots  economic  and political  force  they  must be federated
concerns,  providing  the collective  bargaining  power  into larger structures  that give their members a
that can enable landless  people,  smal farmers  or  political  voice  and provide  services  that strengthen
urban squatters  to negotiate  on more equal terms  the  participation  and bargaining  power of their
with  the  representatives  of government  bureaucracies  members  in the modern  economy.  This federating
or wealthy  private  corporations.  process  has been occurring  in Latn America,  often
Self-reliant  cooperatives,  landless  associations,  through  the leadership  of the POs themselves  (See
irigator associations,  burial  associations,  credit  clubs,  Box 6). In Asia, VO leaders are increasingly  en-
labor  unions,  trade  associations,  elected  local  govern-  couraging the POs they have assisted to  form
ment councils,  and political interest groups with  federated  structures  (See Box  5).
accountable  leadership  are aU examples  of POs.  POs offer important  opportunities  for institu-
Some POs might  also be classed  as VOs,  if shared  tionalizing  sources of  credit, production inputs,
values  are the primary  basis on which  they acquire  marketing services,  technical support, education,
resources  and the commitment  of their members.  health and other essential services  in ways that
However,  POs by definiton exist to  serve their  insure accountability  and  responsiveness  to  the
members,  while  the distinctive  nature of a VO is  people served. The development'  of such support
usually  found in its  commitment  to  values that  structures  becomes an  important  concern of the
transcend  its members'  immediate  interests.  development  catalyst  VO.
POs are commonly  difficult  to classify  according  The differences  between  the catalyst  VO and
to our resource  acquisition  scheme,  because  of the  the P0 have  important  implications  for their funding
mixed  basis  by which  they acquire their resources.  that  are  commonly  overlooked  by  donors. We
Take the example  of a  cooperative,  an important  argued earlier that it is neither realistc nor ap-
form  of people's  organization.  The cooperative  may  propriate to  expect VOs engaged in performing
have highly motivated member leadership that  temporary  catalyst  functions  to become  self-financ-
volunteers  substantial  uncompensated  time  to insure  ing, unless  donors  are prepared  to provide  endow-
the success  of the enterprise.  The members  of the  meat funds.
cooperative  may be committed  to shared values  of  By contrast,  a strong  PO is normally  expected
cooperation  that cause  them to direct  their business  to survive  as a permanent  instituton  senrvig  imporo
to  their cooperative  even when better prices are  tant functions  for its members  on an on-going  basis.
available  elsewhere.  At the same time these same  It is therefore necessary  and appropriate  that the
members  may grant their leaders the authority  to  P0  work seriously  toward making its  activities
impose  penalies or levies  (taxes)  on membership,  largey self-supporting  and locally  sustanable.  Any
much as citizens  in a democratic  society  vest this  external funding should be  consistent  with this
authority  in their  government.  Yet successful  cooper-  outcome,  primarily  supportng  capacity  building,  and
atives  are generaly highly  market-oriented  in their  pcssibly capital investments Excessive outside
external  exchange  transactions.  generosity  in subsidizing  POs to  provide routine
A number  of studies  of NGO  development  roles  services  and to cover  their core oosts will crcate
deal almost  exclusively  with POsO  This represents  dependence  and work to  the detriment of  the
a  recognition  of  their special importance.  The  organization  over  the long term.
problem is that in most Third World countries
strong POs able to help their members  broaden
their economic  and politcal participation  are rela-
tively  rare. ITe donor  that chooses  to work  directly
_15 -Ui  6  iopWOrnltOnu.:  Comminiq  *  To  facilitate local  rsource  mobiiado  and  the
de"vlop.ne of P0s  through which  the poor can
.:'.i  Qousnok  ..n  5.Y  :'  .::.>  ri:  0 if  ........ participate in dieir own development VOs have
The COmuTRInhly.Food  Councils  In Qaace;a  demonstrated  their abilay to  promote local
Mdo.are:  demacmtloaffy..nzn  orOau*atlOflparticipation  and their willingness  to adapt to
o rl  peats.  ernedwth  ego.tn  local needs and conditions  in the support  they
provide  to these  groups.
b. UotS,pt  b- uCMt.  the  Jfl  :.  *  To  delver servces at relatively  low  cost.  This is
.axaca  hWe  elonie  ...... jor. ,cO,  hi  t,,  ;  ... derived from the VO's ability  to mobilize  volun-
dlatwlbtiUon  of  food  anld  other  resoces  In the  0tary  energy  and resources.
a  - Of  it  with  nien  *  To flnd innovative  solutions to novel problems
.95flClS6*  the OflWrgP*  network  Of  pSSStt4Ufl  and to support  successful  innovation  in govern-
Councils  hes ben  able tO  graiduafy  build-  B  ment  programs*4  The capacity  grows  from their
network  that representediapprc;dxnatod  two:  smaU  siu, administrative  flexibility,  and relative
mCion <  .iurnl  cnumers  h, -national  freedom  from political  constraints.e
egtaons  with  gownnet  agencies.
At t*he.-tatelevel,  they hae  Vbegun  purchas-  VO  Weaknesses
ingW  larg. aount  o ferllizer  at beter rates-
tha  prefilouly  possibleand  they hav.ecreated  Vos are commonly  criticized  for having  limited-
thr:ee  autonomousproducers  oraiztons  to
use.  ff;  Ialdrg-.ini  p~er  tO.  Icrease  their  . Tehncal capacity  for comple project. This  is
.ire  :d the market  value of their product  a function  of their smal size and budgets.  They
are limited in the total number of sta  and
Source:  'on'than  '-o  and:  Betsy  Aro  their modest pay  scales limit their ability to
Ndoa;  Coninninity.  Fbod COUt:  cl,  CBS.  attract  staff  with advanced  technical  and profes-
written for the  Synergo.  _  -4itut-.  1"8.  dsional  qualifications.4
Abilty  to  nscake up"  succefid  projecs  to
VO STRENGTHS  AND  WEAKNESSES  achieve  regional  or national  impact.  This is a
function  of small size and resources,  limited
Many  writers  on VOs  have been particularly  inter-  administrative  systems,  intensive  focus  on a few
ested in enumerating  their special strengths  and  communities,  the difficulty  in maintaining  their
weaknesses,  commonly  using government  or com-  essential  value  consensus  as the staff expands,
mercial organizations  as a  basis for comparison,  inattention to  developing  real efficiencZ  and
While  these assessments  differ,  there is a general  expertise  in a  weU  defined technology, and
consensus  that we attempt  to summarize  below.  In  even their own commitments  to their initial
each instance  we have  indicated  the characteristics  beneficiary  populations. 4
of VOs that give them the specal strength or
debility  in question. It should be noted that the VO  *  Abiity to d&wJop  cOflunity  oi'gnns  dth
community  is highly  diverse.  Not alU  VOs reflect the  are able to susadn hemehler once the  VO
strengths  noted here. Nor do all suffer from what  withdraws  its special  staff  and resources.  This  is
are widely  perceived  to be typical  weaknesses.  a  function  of the fact that VOs depend on
short-term, soft-funding sources, commonly
vo  S  ghb  s  define their interventions  as short term, and
work  in isolation  from or even  in competition
In general  evaluators  agree  that VOs  have  a special  with  other  institutions  whose  support  is required
ability  for long-term  viability.  VOs also seldom  give
adequate  attention  in project planning  to sus-
*  To reach the poor and other populations  un-  taufabihty  questions.
served  by public  or commercial  agencies.4  This
capacity  is often a  function of their special  *  Strategic  perspeti  and lnkages  wth  odhr
commitment  to help  poor and neglected  groups.  ipmpt  actors.  VOs often ignore  the larger
context  in which  they  operate,  focusing  only  on
the micro-level  and failing to  recognze the
16 -extent to which the communities  they serve are  type and intensity  that is difficult  to achieve  through
parts of systems strongly influences by  other  coercion or even market forces.
agencies and forcees This weakness may stem  Development planners and donors who recog-
from a  combination of commitment to locality  nize the  special power of voluntary energy as  a
specifc  interventions and  a  sense  of  moral  development resource face a  frustrating dilemma.
superiority  that leads to undervaluing  the ability  They see the potentials of VOs. Yet they need to
and intentions of other orgamzations.  operate on  a  large scale, while VOs tend  to  be
small and scattered, with account  ng systems  that do
Manageril and oganizational  capabilities  .This  not  meet  the  standards of  donor  auditors. The
stems from a  combination of their lack of the  primary tools with which planners and donors work
necessary  skills, reluctance to spend their scarce  are the conventional  government tools of coercion
resources on  functions that  seem unrelated to  and  money. The  use  of either  is  more  likely to
beneficiary needs, donor unwillingness  to fund  suppress than to elicit  the release of voluntary social
administrative  expenses,  and values that equate  energy. Furthermore, their planning and  manage-
administration  with inflexible  bureaucracy.  ment tools call for adherence to project blueprints
and fixed schedules. The social processes through
Rethinking VO St&engths  and Weaknesses  which voluntary social  energy  is  generated  and
released simply don't  conform to  these  types of
To summarize,  voluntary  development  organizations  blueprints and schedules.
have  demonstrated  substantial  comparative  advantag-  The first temptation of planners and donors is
es, especially  their ability to innovate,  adapt to local  to remake the VO to conform to their administra-
conditions, and to  reach and work with poor and  tive and  programming requirements. To do  so is
difficult-to-reach  populations  in developing  countries.  something akin to  killing the  goose that  laid the
These  capacities are  a  function of  their  values,  golden eggs. It is likely to destroy the ability of the
special  skills,  small size, limited resources, flexibility,  VO  to generate the special resource - voluntary
and  freedom from political constraints. They also  social energy -- that is the object of the planner/-
commonly  demonstrate  serious weaknesses,  especial-  donors attention.
ly in  achieving sustainable outcomes on  a  conse-  A  particular danger is that the  planner/donor
quential scale. It is important to note that many of  will create incentives that will encourage VOs to
these weaknesses  are a function of the same charac-  assume more of the characteristics  of PSCs.  Or they
teristics that give VOs their distinctive  advantages,  in  may unintentionaly encourage the formation of new
particular  their  value  commitments, smaUl size,  market driven NGOs,  or PSCs,  primarily  in response
independence  and lack of administrative  rigidity.  to the availability  of funds. The availability  of funds
One important implication  is that it may not be  from foreign donors for family  planning services in
possible to  eliminate all  the  weaknesses in  VOs  Bangladesh,  for example,  has inspired the emergence
without simultaneously  eliminating their strengths.  of agencies legally organized as NGOs that appear
For example, the larger the organization the more  to be more a response to market incentives  than to
difficult it is to sustain the value consensus that is  voluntary  commitment.
critical to  sustaining the  flow of voluntary energy  Differences inherent in the nature of organiza-
that gives the VO its special  quality.  tions in each of the  three  sectors -- government,
On the other  hand, some VO weaknesses are  commercial,  and voluntary  - give organizations in
not  inherent,  i.e.,  they  are  correctable  without  each sector a natural advantage  in some tasks and
eliminating  the qualities that give the VO its distinc-  a natural disadvantage  in others. Thus, for example,
tive strength. However, corrective action must be  it is equally inappropriate to criticize:
grounded  in  an  understanding of  the  distinctive
nature of these organizations.  Otherwise,  wel  inten-  a  Voluntary organizatons for  limited ability to
tioned interventions  may eliminate the very qualities  provide routine services  to large populations  on
that made the VO an attractive partner in the first  a sustained,  self-financing  basis.
place.
Ultimately it is the commitment to values and  a  Government organizations  for limited ability to
social mission that defines the distinctive  strengths  innovate  and to adapt responsively  to the needs
and weaknesses  of the sector. The voluntary energy  of many different groups.
that drives the VO is self-directing  within the para-
meters set by organizational values and visios  It  a  Commercial organizations  for limited ability to
supports innovative problem-solving  behaviors of a  provide services below  cost  to  persons  who
cannot afford to pay.
- 17  -are to have  a consequential  and contrutive role in
Donors and planners  accomplish  little by treating  its drcision  process.
VOs in ways  appropriate  to commercial  or govern-  When  VOs are criticized  for lack of technical
ment agencies.  Voluntary  organizations  are not a  talent,  it is important  to ask what kind of technical
substitute  for government  or commercial  organiza-  capability  the critic believes  they should acquire.
tions in performing  functions  for which  these  other  VOs  commonly  demonstrate  the ability  to undertake
seCtors  are naturally  better suited.  Where a donor  projects  that are highly  complex  from a  social  or
identifies  a need suited  to the nature  of government  political  perspective.  But one would not normally
or  commercial  sector organizations  it should not  turn to a VO to build  a dam  or implement  a major
look to VOs as a cheap  substitute.  reclamation  project. These capabilities  are readily
available  from commercial  firms that would be
technically  ill-suited  to  mobilizing  community  or-
IMPROVING  VO PERFORMANCE  ganizations.
There  are important  opportunities  for improving  Vo  Expanding  Scalk  and SustalnablUty
performance  without  risking  loss of those qualities
that are their distinctive  asset. Many of the past  Not all VOs  have  difficulty  in increasing  the scale  of
limitations  of VOs have  been largely  self-imposed,  their operations.  The Bangladesh  Rural Advance-
partly  due to their own  acceptance  of the prevailing  ment Committee  and the Sri Lankan Sarvodaya
belief that development  leadership  can come only  Shramadana,  for example,  operate programs and
from large organizations  with substantial  financial  projects  of national  scale and employ  thousands  of
resowurces.  As VOs re-examine  their development  staff members.  The difficulties  of sustaining  volun-
roles, many  of them see with increasing  clarity  the  tary  commitments  and value  consensus  in such  large
extent to which their limitations  are largely  self-  organizations  are serious,  but not insurmountable.5
imposed.  As a consequence  they are, in growing  At the same  time there is reason  to question  wheth-
numbers,  thinking  beyond  charitable  action  in a few  er NGOs  operating  on this scale  are most accurately
communities  and giving  greater attention to  the  classified  as VOs or as PSCs.
underlying  causes  of poverty,  injustice,  and environ-  More to the point,  however,  is the question  of
mental  destruction.  whether VOs should  operate programs of such
This means  thinking nore broadly  than  defined  scale,  given  their special  strengths  and weaknesses.
project  areas.  It means  thinking  and acaing  in terms  We would argue that  the scaling up issue has
of people's  movements,  and becoming  engaged  in  generally  been improperly  defined,  at least in rela-
shaping  national  policies  and institudons.  It quickdy  tion to VOs.  It is not evident  that it is in the nature
becomes  evident  that this requires  gaining  access  to  of the VO to operate services  on a very large  scale.
top level  technical  talent,  thinking  strategically  about  There  are other,  possibly  more  appropriate,  ways  for
issues  of scaling  up, and building  organizations  that  them to contribute  toward large scale social and
mobilize  and use resources  effectively.  It becomes  economic  impact,  as illustrated  by the examples  in
equally  evident  that large scale  sustainable  changes  Box  7. The following  are among  the appropriate  VO
require  building  alliances  with  other  organizations  in  roles and strategies  in support  of 'scaling-up."
the voluntary,  commercial,  and government  sectors
to solve  problems  that are intractable  to any  one of  *  Demonstraton and Transfer to Govemment or
them alone. 4 Commercia  Sectors. The VO may prove a
service  concept  to be politically  and economi-
Enhancng Technnal  Capacity  cally  viable  on a pilot basis and then facilitate
its transfer to the government  or commercial
VOs have the capacity  to tap highly  sophisticated  sectors  through provision  of technical  support.
technical  talent  either  as employees  or as volunteers  This was the chosen strategy  of many  of the
- when they set their minds to doing  so.4 There  local affiliates of the  International Planned
has been a  significant  growth  over the past two  Parenthood  Federation  that pioneered  the devel-
decades in  the  number of highly qualified  and  opment  of family  planning  services.  A variation
socially  committed  specialists,  researchers,  lawyers  on this approach was used by Helen Keller
and economists  that have  joined  the staffs  of VOs.sb  International  (HIU) in working  with the Mini-
Of course  when  adding  such  talent, it is important  stry of Health in Sri LIanka  to develop  a pro-
to take care that the individuals  added not only  gram of primary  eye care and cataract treat-
bring technical  expertise.  They must also share in  ment In this instance  rather  than doing  its own
the value commitment  of the organization,  if they  pilot,  HKI helped  the miistry itself  to develop
- 18 -the new  service  on a pilot  basis and then sup-  BOX  7: Appropsa  Scaln  Up
ported  expansion  on a national  scale.
The  Bangadesh Rural  hdecmn  Commit-
•  Doing  Small  Scale-Development  on  a  Larg  tee  (BRAC)  cawed out a naon  wide cam-
Scale through  the  Networkdng of  VOs and  POs.  plgn  tha trined one person  in each houe
For example, In Indonesia WALHI  has promot-  hold  In Bargadesh  to admIiter  oral  e
ed environmental  action on a national scale by  hydtion  trpy.  Thls was accoplisshed  as
promoting the development of a  national net-  a one time  campaign wlth ma  media bac-
work of independent  local environmental  or-  Up.  Recognibn the nee  for susaied  uwp-
ganations. 52 pOt to the community  In other areas such
as Immniation  and Vtmin A dlsbrut.
*  Promote Nahonal Policies  that Enabk Self Help  BRAC  has  been  drawing on  k  own wxper-
Action. This may be effective  where legal bar-  Wem  in vilag  healUt care to assist  Mhlty
riers seriously  constrain  decentralized  self-help  of Heath In deveopng  Xt  capacy d  ks
action. The Institute for Liberty  and Democracy  nrWi  health ces  to  provide this  U
in  Peru  has  identified legal and  procedural  on a sustained  basis throughout tho county.
constraints  that limit the productivity  of the self-  . CARE/Indona  had become recognzed
help employment  in the informal  economy  and  for ts succ  In Itallng  commwnity  mas-
has mobilized broad  political support for key  aged  water  systems.  But a  selWassessmet
legislative  changes.5  led to  the conclusion  that 70 to  80 water
systems  a  year  was  an  nconseqeti
It is important to recognize  that the strength of the  contribution  In  a  country  of  170  mbilIon
voluntary sector  as  a  development agent  is  not  people. Furthermore, all the  resources  aval-
found in the size of its individual  organizations  so  abe  to  lI agerclC  hIn  both ft egOv  D  n
much as in their number and variety, their abilitp  to  and vduntary sectors for water supply  devel-
constantly  evolve,  and the ever  shifting  networks  and  opwmet  WeO not  enough to met  th  needs
coalitions that they form. To focus on the perfor-  oi unserved  populaions  In the  foreseebW
mance  and scale  of individual  VOs is to risk losing  futix  on th  usul  subsidized  bashi Cone-
sight of the aggregate phenomena that they repre-  qiety  CARE lIndonsia  has  reornte 
sent, a  movement that is attempting to return the  strategy to focs  on expelrenfing  wih  self-
control of development  back to the people who are  financng  approaches to vilage waer  supply.
its intended beneficiaries through the  creation of  It then expets  to share the lssons  of tfis
what Annis describes  from the Latin American  experencew  wih governent  and ote  volun-
experience as a  "thickening  web of grassroots or-  tary  organkations  who  want  to  provide
ganizations.'  technical support  throughout the  country In
Cernea describes this movement as:  the  rIstallation  of self-financing  systemrn
a  growing stream which gradually gathers  Ource:  -David C. Korten, BRAC (A). (B) &
its  waters  from  innumerable affluents of  (Q.- and  CARE Indonesia  (A)  (B)  & (C),
various  origin, location,  and content,  at every  teaching cass  available from IDR.,
turn  running into barriers  or  being con-
strained  by straits,  but nevertheless  converg-
ing into  an ever  wider  flow  with  multifaceted  nature and task.
strength.5  Too often, the criticism  of VO management
capabilities  is substantialy  motivated  by the concern
In general it is probably inappropriate to look to  of  donors  with  meeting their  own  audting  and
VOs as large scale service providers. But there is  reporting requirements. There is little evident rela-
nothing that  predudes  their pursuit of  strategies  tion between performing  these tasks wetl and actual
aimed at large scale consequences,  as demonstrated  development effectiveness,  partiejArly in the more
by a rich experience.  innovative  roles of the VO.
The  control oriented  st).rs  of  management
Improving VO Management  common to  government, and generally favored by
donors, are not effective  when the goal is innovative
We do not see any inherent reason why  a VO must  problem-solving  and  the mobilization of voluntary
be poorly  managed.  But the management  procedures  energy.  The modern literature on corporate manage-
and styles chosen must be appropriate to the VO's  ment demonstrates that the most effective  forms of
- 19 -management, even for  large  market-oriented cor-  Me ly development problems have the charac-
porations, are those that seek to mobilize  the self-  teristic  of  social  "messes," in  which  interacting
motivation and  self-direction of staff through the  conste  itions  of problems reinforce one another and
development  of value consensus  regarding the firm's  frustr .te single agency efforts at  solution. 6'  Multi-
social role.'  sector  partnerships of  institutions from  different
These forms  of  management emphasize self-  sectors that utilize  the special  strengths of each ma,
directing, problem-solving  teams. They also feature  be a key to unlocking  many development  problems.
well developed accounting and information  systems,  The  potentials for  joining forces with  other
but these systems  are designed to provide informa-  organizations  within or beyond the voluntary sector
tion useful in self-directed problem solving rather  are being discovered  by a growing  number of VCs.
than  to  assure  close  adherence  to  budgets and  An  example of the  type of  collaboration that  is
blueprints.  These forms of management are well  resulting  is illustrated in Box 8.
suited to VOs.  VOs have natural advantages  in facilitating  the
Resistance  among VOs to management  improve-  formation of  such  partnerships  by  acting as  a
ment is rapidly declining.  As VOs take themselves  credible bridge among potential partners who have
and their development  roles more seriously,  they are  histories of conflict  or mistrust.' Their independence
also becoming more  interested in improving their  gives them a  degree of neutrality and  flexibility, T 4
managerial  capabilities.  The barriers are increasingly  and sometimes confers a degree of credibility  that
found in the lack of adequate sources of assistance  other  participants in  the  partnership lack -- par-
in developing  appropriate management systems  and  ticularly  in dealing  with poverty  groups. A. . s  ;ame
skills;58  and donor resistance to funding administra-  time, the experience of VOs in relating vith  cdif-
tive overhead and staff development  expenses.'  ferent  constituencies --  POs, donors, govt-  -nment
agencies -- can be a  critical input to the sensitive
negotiations  required to launch  and maintain  cooper-
INTER-SECTORAL  RELATIONS  ative activity  among very diverse agencies.6'
Important though  it  is, there  are  important
Balanced  development  is a complex  undertaking  that  barriers  to  collaborative problem-solving  in manky
cannot be achieved by any one sector alone. Each  Third  World countries, particularly between VOs
sector -- market, government, and  voluntary -- is  and governments.
subject to  failures inherent  in  its  nature. These
failures can often be  compensated by strengths of  Uneasy Relations between  Governments and VOs
organizations  from other sectors. Pluralistic  societies
that foster the strength of all three sectors thus gain  At  the  most  basic level, as  outlined earlier, the
institutional  advantages  over societies dominated by  distinctive  role of government  is to maintain order
a  single sector  in  the  wealth  of  organizational  and stability. The distinctive  role of VOs is experi-
resources they can bring to bear on difficult prob-  mentation, innovation, and  change consistent with
lems.  core val,ies of their members. Though both govern-
But  in  practice  such  collaboration  is  often  ment a  d VOs contribute to a dynamic  society,  it is
difficult to  start  and  even  more  problematic to  easy for tnem to come in conflict.  It is also easy for
sustain. The  differences among  the  sectors  are  agencies v  each sector to become preoccupied  with
simultaneously  the source of potential  synergies  and  their oWL  importance  and lose sight of the extent to
the cause of setious misunderstandings.  which th ir  effectiveness can be enhanced by the
effectiveness  of other sectols.
Development  Partnerships  From the point of view of those who hold state
power, VOs and POs may represent more than a
Cooperation across sectors is an attractive  means of  source of competing ideas. Even enlightened politi-
using the special capacities of different sectors in  cal leaders who recognize the role of  `'tutional
development projects. The  importance of public-  pluralism in achieving development dyn-. -ir  m  are
private partnerships between government  and busi-  aware that the sector may also produce poUacal  and
ness is increasingly  recognized in some settings.  For  economic  competition. VOs are commonly training
example, in the  United States there  has  been  a  grounds for  alternative leadership, and  sometimes
dramatic escalation over the past decade in the use  the  temporary haven of  out-of-power opposition
of  public service contracting as  a  substitute for  politicians.  Consequently,  there are good reasons for
direct delivery  of public  services  through government  politicians  in power to look with a wary eye on the
bureaucracies. The  resulting competition among  emergence of a dynamic  voluntary sector.
service providers results in increased efficiencyq.
-20  -For these reasons, Third World governments  Box  z.  Development  Partnerhip:  Savings
are inclined  to assess VOs and their contributions  Development  Foundation In Zimbabwe
more from a political  perspective  than from econo-
mnic  efficiency  perspective  that tends to preoccupy  In  Zimbabwe, the  Savings  Dowopmnt
donorse' and  to  make decisions  regarding their  Foundation (SDF) works with govemment
regulation  on this basis  -- rather than on the basis  ministrbs and private firms to support  In-
of their potential  as engines  of social  and economic  crease  agricultural  production  among  small-
development.  The less secure  a government  is about  holders, pariculary women. SDF pinerd
its own  political  legitimacy,  the greater its reason  to  a  simple method of  encouraging weely
fear a populace  mobiized  in autonomous  organiza-  savings d  small amounts of  money by
tions  -- and the more ikely  it will  seek to control,  households organized  Into neighborhood
even  suppress,  the voluntary  sector,' as w5il  as the  group  and devie  a fnncial  reoord-keep-
free market  commercial  sector.  Ing system accessible  to non-literate  people.
Michael  Bratton  has identified  four categories  of  As a resuilR  group members-numrrring by
control  mechanism  used by African  governments  to  1985 about 250,000 persons In more than
control  VOs and POs, rangin from the relatively  5,700 dubs-now  save  enough money to
subtle  to the outright  coercive.  place bulk orders for fetilizer and  seed.
Rural  women  thereby Increase  their financS
•  Monitonng/Registrtion. In order to transact  Irdependence and modemize their fanning
business,  and  particularly  to  receive foreign  skills.
funding,  in most countries  a VO must  be regist-  The parnership Involves the Mlnistry  of
ered.  This can be a proforma  procedure  involv-  Community Development and  WomeWs
ing a  few straightforward  requirements  or  a  Affairs,  whose fedd staff are trained by SDF
serious  barrier to NGO formation.6  Requiring  to teach the savings methodology,  and th
government  approval  of foreign  funding  contribu-  Ministry of  Af1culture, whose  extension
tions  also provides  opportunities  for harassment  agents are llnked by SDF to  groups why
and delay, even where approval  is ultimately  raquire  technical  services.
granteAd.  The  -parnrship has also Involved  a privte
fetiIzer company to flnance  the production
*  Coordindon.  Haphazard patterns of  rural  of tralning  materials.  The company's  sales to
development  can lead to official  coordination  of  peasant farmers  have Increased  as a conse-
VO activities.  At local  levels  VO activities  may  quence  -of Increased  savings.
to subject to  approval  by a  local agency  or  By the  mid-Eighties  this Innovative.  low-
official,  affirming  that development  activities  are  cost, and  participatory  approach to raising
a monopoly  of the state.  agricultural  production  among  the rural  poor
had become finrmy  lnstitutionalized  In Zim-
babwe  as a trgateral  partnership  between  the
*  Co-optalion.  In some  countries  all development  public,  private,  -and voluntary  sectors.
VOs are required to become members  of a
government  sponsored  coordinating  body.  The  Source: Michael  BraKton
body may be  registered as  a  VO, but will
commonly  have  a board  of trustees  controlied  by
senior  government  officials.  Control  under such
bodies may include review and approval of  Many Third World governments  have been par-
operating  plans  or control  of all foreign  funding.  ticularly  pre-occupied  with  controUling  POs,  especial-
Co-optation  is particularly  popular  with  authorit-  ly labor unions  and cooperatives.  Throughout  much
arian governments  of the political  left.?  of the Third  World  government  control  of coopera-
tives is so complete  that they are more accurately
*  Reornizadon,  Dissolution,  and Imprnismuna  described as  government agencies, created and
These less sdbtle control measures include  managed  by the state, than as POs. VO leaders  in
forced  reorganizations  in which  the government  India  have  expressed  concern  that their government
replaces  the existing  leadership,  (often in the  may  follow  the same  regulatory  path  with VOs  that
name of  correcting some financial abuse),  undermined  the cooperative  movement  as an in-
dissolution  of the organization,  or imprisonment  dependent  force for self-reliant  local development.
of the  organization's leaders --  without legal  See Box 9.
recourse.
- 21 -This reglatory  process can proceed in small  ments is based on their ability to deliver scrvices.
incremental stcps--each of  which is relatively in-  Any VO that delivers services more cffectivcly  and
nocuous  and apparently  well-intentioned.  The cumul-  efficicntly ihan  government becomes  a  political
ative  impact of  many smail steps, however, can  thrcat, no matter how benign its intentions.
devastatc the independence  needed for the effective  There are basically three options open to  the
operatioui  of both VOs and POs.' 2 regime so threatened. One is to position itself to
The threat that some governments  perceive  VOs  claim credit for VO accomplishments.  A  second is
to pose does not arise purely from their more overt  to  hinder VO  operations to  the  point that  they
efforts to spawn political  competition  in their societ-  become ineffective.  A third option is to displace the
ies. The legitimacy of many Third World govern-  voluntary  sector by creating captive organizations  to
assume the  apparent  functions of  VOs,  but  as
instruments  of the  regime.
Box 9: Cooperatives  Legislation In
India  Captive Organizations: GONGOs and DONGOs
The first Cooperatives Act was Introduced In  NGOs that are created as captives of government
India in 1904 "to  encourage thrift,  self help and  to substitute for true NGOs are commonly  re"ferred
cooperation  among  agriculturalists, artisans  to by NGO leaders as "CONGOs," which  stands for
and  persons  of limited means,  and  for that  government-organized  NGOs. GONGOs are created
purpos& to  provide for the  constitution and  and registered as NGOs by govcrmnental  agencies
control of cooperative societies."  It was a ten  as instrumcnts of governmcnt poticy with govern-
page  document that left it to the cooperative  ment deftned missions.  An example is the Indones-
members to use their own Initiative  In rnanage-  ian  women's organization, the  PKK. Its  national
ment  matters. The Registrar of Cooperatives  chairman is  the  wife of  the  Minister of  Home
was to provide for their legal registration,  audit  Affairs. Each provincial  organization is chaired by
their accounts  free of  charge,  and  perform  the wife of the governor,  and so on down through
certain fairly minimal  regulatory functions.  the hierarchy. It is made clear to wives  of govern-
Subsequent  versions of the law dropped  "to  ment officials  that they are expected to participate.
encourage  thrift, self-help and  cooperationr  The formation of a GONGO seldom reflects a
from the purpose,  Increased the Involvement  spontaneous expression of a shared value commit-
of govemment, and all but eliminated member  ment, and participation  is often less than voluntary.
control over their own organizations. The Act  The motives in forming such organizations  may be
in force in Andhra Pradesh  State In 1985 was  positive,  and they may serve useful social functions,
over 80 pages  in length and  gave the Regist-  but they are less likely  than agencies more squarely
rar of Cooperatives the power, among others,  positioned  in the voluntary  sector to serve as conse-
to: divkie  and consolidate cooperatives, amend  quential  agents of social innovation.'
the  by-laws  of  any  cooperative,  postpone  As donors become  more interested in NGOs,
management committee elections and appoint  they also find themselves  tempted to create NGOs
a "person-In-charge!  to  assume  the  manage-  suited to their own perceived  needs. Such agencies
ment  committee's  functions, supercede  the  might be  called 'DONGOs," or  donor-organized
decisions  of  elected  committees,  and  Issue  NGOs. The mission of a DONGO will normally  be
Instructions  that all cooperatives were required  defined by its sponsoring donor. Such organizations
to follow - irrespective  of the wishes  of the  may  serve useful functions for  the  donor, while
cooperative's members.  offering a degree of flexibiiity  in administration  and
Due to  application of these  provisions, aii  funds disbursement  that the donor's own procedures
cooperatives throughout Andhta Pradesh were  might not allow. 74
for  several  years  managed  by  persons-in-  Since donors are particularly  preoccupied with
charge  who  had  no  accountability to  the  the disbursement  of funds and usually  find their own
members. Free election of management coi-  procedures and  modes  of  working ill  suited to
mittees  by cooperative  members  was restored  making  grants to dozens,  or even hundreds, of small
only as a result of a successful  court  action  scattered organizations,  the  DONGOs they create
brought by  Samakhya,  a  VO committed to  are most often funding  bodies. This does not create
restoring  the independence  of cooperatives  in  a  particular problem in itself, unless a  number of
Andhra  Pradesh.  donors should decide to pool their funds and chan-
nel them through a  single DONGO -- creating a
Source:  Samakhya  single control point for  funds in violation of the
- 22  -pluralism  principle  we will  outline  later. Ultimately  GUIDELINES  FOR DONOR  ACIION
the person  or persons  who  control  this oranizadon
gains inordinate  control  over the sector  Such an  There  are important  dilemmas  in any  effort  to forge
orgnization  also  becomes  a natural  take-over  target  partnerships  between  VOs and major donors.  As
for a government  that feels threatened  by indepen-  articulated  by Michael  Bratton:
dent VOs.
Concerns  with coordination,  size, and technical  Big donors  and small  NGOs  make uncom-
capacity  of NGOs  may  encourage  donors  to support  fortable  bedfellows  by virtue of unbridge-
the idea that NGOs should b_ brought together  able  differences  of scale,  ethos  and capacity.
under coordinating  bodies  that can  absorb  and retail  In  an  asymmetrical  power relationship
large  blocks  of donor  funds,  insure  proper account-  driven by the movement  of money, the
ing standards,  and coordinate  responsibilities  for  goals  of the dominat agency  will  invariably
serice coverage.  This concern  may  lead donors  to  displace  the goals  of the subordinate  part-
suggest  that government  form  an NGO coordinating  ner.3
body,  or the donor might  decde to act directly  to
form or  co-opt a  naticnal level NGO or NGO  The differences  between  VOs  and large  donors  are
consortium  body  to serve  as a conduit  and a coor-  important  and often  difficult  to bridge  effectively.  In
dinating  agency.  general,  donor  agencies  tend to deal in money  and
Such  initiatives  may  appear  to suit the needs  of  technology,  VOs deal in values,  people  and institu-
the donor, but  they carry considerable  risk of  tions. Donor agencies  work with central govern-
disrupting  or co-opting  the organizations  they are  ments; VOs work with grass roots organizations.
intended to assist. The distinction  between VOs,  Donor agencies engage in  large projects; VOs
POs, and PSCs becomes  important  here. There is  engage in  small projects. Donor agencies fund
no contradiction  in a donor effort to  coordinate  contracts;  VOs depend  on grants Donor agencies
activities  of PSCs through the use of centralized  emphasize  pre-planning  VOs engage in adaptive
contracting  mechanisms.  But any external  effort  to  learning.  Donor agencies  find strength  in their size;
impose coordination on VOs and POs represents a  VOs in their numbers and adaptability.
denial  of their esseontial  nature.  There are many  opportunities  for complemen-
The donor that is conscious  of such issues  may  tarity,  there is also much potential  for conflict  and
seek  to avoid  the imposition  of external  coordinadon  mutual  damage.  There are no easy  rules for donors
by seeking  to channel  its funds through an existing  interested in assisting  VOs and the VO sector. We
autonomous  NGO consortium  body  governed  by its  believe,  however,  that two basic tests of available
own  members.  This too can have unintended conse-  choices  - vountaism  and  piwusm  - provide
quences.  Consortium  bodies normally  exist to be  useful  guides  to action.
responsive  to the needs and interests  of their mem-
bers. When NGO  consortium secretariats become  The  Test of Voluntarism
involved  in  exercising  judgements on  individual
member  proposals  for the purpose  of allocating  a  Commercial  organizations  are  driven by market
limited block of funds it  inevitably  changes  the  demand for goods or services.  In  working  with
relationship  between  the consortium  body and its  commercial  organizations  it is appropriate  for don-
members.  It may also politicize  elections  for the  ors to say what goods  and services  they  want, and
board of the consortium  body  by enticing  politically  for vendors  who  can provide  them with an accep-
ambitious  members  to compete  for control  over  the  table return to present their bids. In the develop-
consortium's  fund.'  ment "business,"  donors  contract  with agencies  that
If  donors and governments  are to  build an  demonstrate  their ability  to meet required  quality
effective  partnership  with  VOs, it is important  that  standards  at the least cost. The contract  specifica-
they  recognize  the distinctive  social  roles  of the VO  tons and the donor demand  that they  be met as a
and the extent to which these roles turn on the  condition  of payment  constitute  the relevant  control
VO's independence.  They must also be  able to  mechanism.
recogpize  the nature of NGO variants  like DON-  In contrast,  the donor's  guarantee  of VO per-
GOS,  and GONGOs."  formance  is the VO's demonstrated  commitment  to
its mission  and values.  If the VO is to exercise  its
distinctive  competence  as an agent  of innovation  the
relationship  between  the donor and the VO must
give  the VO the flexibility  it requires.  It is entirely
possible  that specific  outputs cannot  be known  in
- 23 -advance,  and therefore cannot be contracted in the  commonly  have a program that has evolved  on the
conventional  sense.  basis of learning from its own experience. tm Where
In a values-driven  organization the value com-  the organization's  program consists  of partial short-
mitment is the source of motivation and discipline.  term commitments  that coincide  with shifting  donor
Sinec the  value commitment is  intcrnal, the  or-  fads--one  year women in development,  the next year
ganization is largely self-regulating  with respect to  child survival and the next snall enterprise develop-
those values. With such organizations grants with  ment--one might ask  if  it  is market-driven more
broad terms of reference are appropriate, especially  than values-driven.
when the donor is more interested in investing in
the organization  and its mission  commitment  than in  The Test of Balanced Pluallsm
purchasing  a specific  service or product. Under such
grrnts VOs are answerable  to donors more in terms  When  choosing interventions that  bear  on  the
of faithfulness  to their espoused misons  and values  development  of the voluntary  sector, we believe  that
than in terms of pre-specified  contracts and outputs.  balanced pluralism among the  sectors is a  useful
Of  course donors  dealing with  values-driven or-  guide. By balanced pluralism, we refer to develop-
ganizations have to be  well informed about their  ment  of different sectors consistent with effective
values if they are to avoid unpleasant surprises.  use of their complementary  strengths.
This leaves the donor with a difficult question.  A key issue in the evolution  of balanced plural-
How does it know whether it is working  with a real  ism is the distribution of power among the sectors.
VO, when many organizations  with non-governmen-  While equality among them is not practical in most
tal, non-profit  legal status may be GONGOs, DON-  countries,  some degree of mutual influence  is critical
GOs, or PSCs rather  than true value drive VOs?  to  using their complementary strengths welL The
Whether  an  organization is  non-governmental or  test of pluralism  involves  one basic question:
non-profit is easily established.  Whether it is a VO
by our definition  is less easily  determined, and very  *  Does the proposed interventio- enhance institu-
much a matter of judgement.  tional pluralism and  mutual influence in  the
As the availability  of public funding for NGO  society?
activities increases, so  to  do  reports  of  retired
bureaucrats,  unemployed local  touts  and  other  When the  intervention would be  more  likely to
opportunity seeking  individuals rushing  to  form  create monopoly  control over  a particular institution-
NGOs to qualify for funding. These organizations  al space, reduce the  independence of existing or-
are formed more as an entrepreneurial response to  ganizations,  or create a control point that might be
market or political opportunities than on the basis  used to limit freedom of independent association,  it
of value commitments. Donors should not  expect  fails the test.
that  such NGOs will act  like VOs, or  even like  The issues involved  are complex Take the case
responsible  PSCs.  of funding for voluntary activities.  Many donors are
The test of voluntarism,  which involves asking  interested in increasing the flow of funding to VOs
questions  such as the following,  can be quite helpful  and  POs. There  are  also  calls for  greater  local
control of such funds, on the grounds that funding
*  Does the organization  have a well defined sense  decisions  should be made by indigenous  rather than
of its mission, and has there been continuity  in  expatriate organizations.
its basic commitments  over the years?  The range of possible mechanisms  for financing
voluntary  activity  is quite broad, a subject we touch-
*  Is there evidence that the  staff, and especially  ed upon above. What guidance is provided by the
the leaders, work for the organization primarily  "test of  pluralism" in  choosing among them? For
because they believe in its mission?  purposes of illustrating  the underlying  issue, we can
put forward a worst case scenario:
*  Has the staff accepted adverse working condi-
tions, when necessary,  to pursue that mission  - It is required that all financial  contributions
including  working at salaries below the market  to VOs, whether from government or pri-
rate for people of their education, ability and  vate, foreign  or domestic  sources,  must pass
performance?  through  a  single  govermment-controlled
agency that  has sole power to  decide on
The track record is criticaL  Substantial  differences  in  their allocation.
commitment  and capability  will have a major bear-
ing on  VO  performance. An  effective VO  will
-24  -In this scenario there  is a single decision point, a  that  represents  the  foundation of  the  voluntary
total  monopoly on  voluntary rmancial resources.  sector.
Decision-making  would be in the hands of a single
individual or group, virtually eliminating the pos-
sibility that the sector will serve multiple perspec-  MODES OF DONOR SUPPORT FOR VOS
tives and  values. The  interests  served would be
almost certainly those of the persons who control  What  are  ways in  which large donors  can work
the state.  effectively  with VOs? On the basis of the discussion
An alternative  scenario  with respect to pluralism  so far, we can identify  at least five possibilities.
might look like the following.
1. ProvidIng  Direct  Financial  Support
A  strong prevailing norm  of voluntarism
encourages  individuals  in the society  to con-  Most donors are primarily funding agencies It
tribute ten percent of their income and time  is natural -or them to think first in terms of provid-
to voluntary  causes  of their choice.  The state  ing VOs with increased financial support for their
supports voluntary funding of VOs through  activities.  There  is no  question that  VOs require
tax exemptions  for contributions  to qualified  fin&acial  resources  and might benefit from increased
organizations.  Qualifying for  tax-exempt  flows of  those  resources  But  there  are  several
status is simple, and freedom of association  dangers involved.
and expression is protected by the courts.!'
*  Too much money can undermine voluntarism.
In this scenario the state sets the basic framework.  Those who carry the  values of the VO  must
The choice of priorities in the allocation of funding  remain clear on the organization's mission and
resides entirely with individual  citizens according  to  their own reason for participating.  Money must
their individual  value preferences.  remain secondary  to mission.
These two scenarios represent the extremes of
the  spectrum from unitary central control to  the  . The easiest relationship for donors is to enlist
ultimate pluralism of  individual  choice. The latter  VOs as contractors to implement projects, and
scenario is generally limited as an option both for  to  deal with them  essentially as  commercial
lack of governmental  commitment and for insuffi-  firms. VOs that respond to this invitation may
cient development of an ethic of charitable giving,  find themselves  reorienting their basic nature to
We would argue, however,  that in choosing among  become PSCs rather than social catalysts.
the  policy options that  it will support, the donor
preference should be  toward those  options that  a  Donors that seek to support VOs by earmarked
represent  greater  pluralism, ie.,  more  broadly  government-to-government  transfers of funds to
distributed choice making. Thus for example:  be reallocated by the  recipient govermnent  to
VOs  risk  undermining VO  independence by
•  Pubfic  financial support of VO activities  should  giving the  state  control  over  their  funding.
give preference to tax incentives for individual  Grants  administered  through  the  recipient
contributions  over direct govermment  funding.  government can inadvertenty compromise the
pluralism that is essential to the strength of the
•  Direct public funding of VOs should be  dis-  voluntary sector.
persed across multple  ministries and levels of
government  rather than centrally  controiled.  Alleviation of  poverty depends  as  much  on  the
strengthening  of institutions  for political  participation
*  Blocks of funds contributed to  indigenous or-  as on the strengthenivag  of institutions  that guarantee
ganizations to  allocate should be  distributed  economic  competition. Both  forms  of  initiative
through  several independent  agencies  rather than  depend on the institutional  pluralism  to which most
through a single conduit organization.  VOs are committed.
If donors accept this perspective  as the basis for
Donors should decline to participate in or endorse  !heir relationships with  the  VO  community, they
any scheme that  calls for  channeling all  foreign  must recognize  that on many issues VOs have more
contributions to  the  voluntary sector  through  a  relevant expertise  than donors.  Where the VOs have
single govermnment  controlled agency.  Such schemes  greater expertise, it is appropriate for them to take
are, by their nature, a direct denial of the pluralism  the lead in defining  the relationship.
-25  -This will  not be easy for either party.  Few  VOs  quate safeguards,  it is better for large donors to
have  given  serious  thought  to the possibility  of such  focus  on other approaches.
a  relationship.  Neither have donors. The donors  POs are also subject  to co-optation  and donor
would  have  to learn to listen and to play  a suppor-  support  for them can be even more problematic.
tive role, seeking  ways  to respond  constructively  to  POs  ideally  are permanent  community  organizations
the needs  and agendas  of the VOs.  The VOs  would  that mobilize  local resources to  meet continuing
have  to learn  to grapple  with  issues  and concerns  on  local needs.  Their  strength  depends  even  more than
more of a national  scale.  that of  VOs on  their becoming financiaUy  self-
Avoiding  the hazards  of direct  financing  of VOs  reliant.
will require new mechanisms  for  making funds
available  in amounts  and through  procedures  that  2. Finandng Sector  Support lnsdtutions
will not overwhelm  or pervert  their special  capaci-
ties. Appropriate  guidelines  might include  the fol-  Our review  of the weaknesses  of VOs suggests  that
lowing  they  often  need  support  other than increased  finan-
cial resources.  Donors may well contribute,  for
Direct aid for  VOs, particularly  from large  example,  to the improvement  of VO technical  or
public donors,  should generally  be limited to  management  capacities.  This  might  be accomplished
two types of organizationn  by providing  resources  to promote the emergence
and effectiveness  of voluntary  sector  support  institu-
o  Large  and well-established  VOs  whose  track  tions like the following
record  demonstrates  their  capacity  to handle
large blocks of funds  without  being  over-  a  Regional  national  and sub-national  VO consor-
whelmed  or co-opted.  tium  bodies  that enable  individual  VOs  to share
experience  and effective  innovations,  undertake
o  Organizations  that function  in the role of  cohesive  action to  resist destructive  pressures
private  foundations  in making  small  grants  from international  agencies  or government,  and
to VOs and POs. These might be quasi-  to create  strategic  networks  and evolveintegrat-
governmental  organizations  such as  the  ed natiotal sector  strategies  for development.
publicly  funded  German  foundations  or the
U.S.  Iter-American  Foundation.  They  might  *  Institutions  offering  training and consultation
also be entirely  private  foundations  geared  services  to VOs,  especially  in priority  areas  such
to this purpose  such  as the Foundation  for  as strategy  formulation,  organization  develop-
the Peoples  of the South Pacific  or Philip-  ment,  management  trainiog,  community  organiz-
pine  Business  for Social  Progress.  CIDA  has  ing, and various  technical  areas.
created  several  foundation-like  mehanisms
for the channeling  of assistance  to NGOs  in  a  Research institutes that offer the  voluntary
Asia.  sector access  to  high quality technical  advice
and research  supporL  Such  information  can be
*  Funding  should  take the form of broadly  defin-  critcal in helpig VOs  influence  policy  decisions
ed grants  tied to mutually  agreed  "program  mis-  that require analytic  sophistcation  that indiv-
sions"  that are evaluated  in terms of general  idual  VOs seldom  possess.
development  values and objectives rather than
specific  and concrete contracted outputs.  *  Advocacy  centers that make available to  VOs
and POs  expertise  in developing  policy  positions,
*  Reporting  systems  should  be standardized  across  planning advocay  strategies and  lobbying
donors and not require  or reward the commit-  legislatures.  As more VOs and POs become
ment of substantial  VO resources  to satisfying  interested  in shaping  the larger policy  contexl,
special  needs  of individual  donors  that make  no  such  advocacy  and legislative  skills  will  be more
contribution  to  improving  the  VC's mission  in demand.
performance.
The more the voluntary  sector  moves  from work  at
Providing  direct  assistance  to key  VOs  is potentially  the grassroots  to asking questons about how to
an important  role for donors.  But mechanisms  are  influence  institutional  and policy  contexts,  the more
needed  to provide  that support  without  undermining  important  specialized  insttutions  characteristic  of a
the distincive  nature of the sector. Without ade-  strong  voluntary  sector  will  become.
-26-Donor  agencies may be  able to  support the  creases.  The contribution  of such resources  to volun-
work  of  grassroots  organizations indirectly with  tary  development activity can  be  encouraged by
resources given to institutions that serve the sector  legislation  that provides tax or other incentives.
as a whole,  even when direct financial  aid to operat-  Donors might consider building capability to
ing VOs is not practical for the reasons discussed  advise countries on how to structure incentives  that
earlier.  will encourage private voluntary financing of VOs.
Considerable  experience  has been gained around the
3. Increasing PoUtical  Space  world with such tax incentives.  As a staring  point it
may be  appropriate to  survey this  experience for
Our analysis leads us to conclude that some of the  lessons. Examination  of how the philanthropic  ethic
most promising opportunities for donor support of  develops in a country and how traditional charities
the voluntary  sector lie in the realm of policy  dialo-  can be encouraged  to support development-oriented
gue with national governments  rather than in direct  activities  is also worth attention.
financing. There  are  few  natural  incentives for
governments to encourage VOs, even though they  VO Parwipation  in Policy POCesses Governments
can play an importt  role in the long term devel-  commonly  require that VOs obtain prior permisson
opment process. Donors had to assume a lead role  for activities to insure that they are supportive of
in  gaining recogniton  for  the  importance of the  the priorities of the government.  Less common have
market, and they may have to provide similar lead-  been decisions like that of the Aquino government
ership in promoting policy and operating space for  in Philippines to  invite VOs to  participate in  the
VOs.  deliberations of municipal, provincial,  and regional
There  are  three  areas  to  which  particular  planning councils to help insure that the  develop-
attention should be directed.  ment plans of the government  are responsive  to the
needs of the people.
Guarantees  of  Freedom of  Associadon. For  the  In  general,  development policy deliberations
commercial sector to function efficiently,  legal and  have suffered from lack of effective  feedback from
procedural barriers that constrain the market must  the  grass roots.  Even the  introduction of  locally
be minimized.  Similarly,  for the voluntary  sector to  elected councils has  only partiatly addressed this
perform its  social role effectively,  legal and  pro-  problem, because local elites have often controlled
cedural barriers to  free association and expression  those councils to  serve their own interests. In  a
must be minimized -in  accord with the universal  number of countries VOs have been addressing  this
declaration  on human rights.  Registration  procedures  problem by helping  the poor organize  themselves  to
should be  simple  and  easily negotiated by  any  support the election of their own candidates. But
legitimate group  that  meets  the  basic standards.  effective  feedback  channels  from VOs or representa-
Reporting should similarly  be simple and limited to  tives of the poor remain the exception rather than
routine  annual reports  of  acivities  znd  finances  the rule.
appropriate to  the  public record. Recognized or-  Donors can do much to help recipient govern-
ganizaions,  so  long as they are  not convicted of  ments explore mechanisms for expanding popular
illegal activities, should not  have to  obtain prior  participation in a variety of policy  forums. Again a
approval for  ordinary activities and financial con-  first  step  might  be  to  compile an  inventory of
tributions.  experience  with efforts by VOs and POs to provide
Just  as  donors  have  developed experise  in  substantive  input to public policy  processes.
advising on  policies, laws, and  procedures for  a
productive  market sector, so might they develop  the  4. Creating Feedback Unks from VOs to Donors
expertise required  to advise national governments
about the promotion of a  strong and constructive  Donors need  the kind of feedback that  VOs can
voluntary  sector. A first step might be to develop  an  provide  as much as governments  do. VOs concerned
inventory of  relevant policies and  procedures in  with  development  and the environment  have  become
countries  at differing  stages of development  and with  increasingly  active  in providing  donors with feedback
differing political systems to better understand the  on the negative  environmental  and social  consequen-
range of options and their consequences.  ces of some of their projects. Some donors have
taken such feedback seriously  and have built mech-
Policies  Encouraging  Pivate  Philanthopy.  As  anisms  for continuing  the dialogue.  This is a positive
middle classes emerge in developing  countries, the  step and should be given increasingly  serious atten-
potential  for  generating significant resources for  tion. But donor mechanisms  for obtaning and acting
voluntary sector activities within the  country in-  on needed feedback are stilt limited.
- 27 -As VOs become more comfortable  in dealing  1  10. IntW-SctoMI  Colabomtobn. :
with donors as partners, they will probably  seek
greater  involwement  in early  project  planning  in the  In  IndonlsU  thO  Institu for  Soco-Economl'
hope of reducing  some of the negative  social  and  Researh, Trainin and In  an LlES).
environmental  consequences  of large development  amaor vountaly  agecy,  has be  siing
projects.  Donors might find the establishment  of  t  aionaltb  ostrengthen
national VO advisory  groups to be usefuL  just as  vofllOIlt .ln IIlPIf  devoe  ld
some have  experimented  successfuHlly  with intena-  managen.  W  rt  finding and thial
donal VO advisory  groups.  SUipO(t  *om the' Ford  undatio  :lth
One important  issue that donors will need to  U.Sf :ntenatal-D
face is the secrecy  of their own proceedings  and  the Iistitute his  assited  the  Mtniiel  o
documentation.  Donors typically  treat  their own  PUblc  Wbfk. Home  MaiAfaIrand  'aQIcM`u.A
planning  documents  as privileged  information  to be  InIy  thl  y  tined  a]ndsUpWlecld  gov
shared only with authorized  representatuves  of the  mnt: CommrJnity  aln  enien  -n
recipient  government.  It is the rare representativa  of  p1ot prW"s  atmred  at  e0=liwcn  fame
a donor agency  who is prepared  to openly  share  IGIs-  in the: dIevoIpr6ent of  ri
such information  with individuals  or  groups that  tems.
might  be critical  of their content.  There are reports  AA  the Instftute  became  awr o  X 
of indigenous  NGOs in Asia being able to obtain  a d polly Impediments  to buWld 
documentation  on  World Bank  projects being  water users'  organiations,  thy  exponded
planned  or implemented  in their countries  only by  thelr efforts  to Include  studies and dialogue
working  through  U.S.  NGOs  that could  more  readily  with govemment offcials-  about the%  lea
acquire  documents  from the Bank  in Washington.  status  and powers  of User.  organiz.
Some NGOs are demanding  that Bank docu-  Even  in smalli  rrigationssystems,the go
mentation  be treated as a matter of public  record  ment usually  held managemer  uthoritW..
accessible  to any citizen  of either donor  or recipient  In 1987 the WOrd Bank, draMwng  on the
country.  Nearly  all U.S. government  information  is  Wofk  -of-the  Institete,  agreed.with  the-,  g
available  on request to  US.  citizens  under the  mrent  to  uppofrt.  transferrn m
Freedom  of Information  Act, and some NGOs  want  rSponlSbblty for  ll  system.1  the
this principle  to be applied  to international  develop-  gemment  to water  usrasociati 
ment agencies.  pJtet  inos8  the Institute  in a key olto:
The greatest  resistance  may  come  from  borrow-  traln govrnment  employees for prildng
ing  governments.  Most  governments,  including  many  th  aseoclato  to  take on  these ni.
democracies,  insist  on some  confidentiality  regarding  responsibUltles.e  Insttite Is iwo  adBIng
public  business.  It must be remembered,  however,  on the Institutnal changes  needtsu.
that it is ultimately  the people who are borrowing  port1thenew  policy.  The Institute p
the money,  not the government.  It is the people  who  tion In this projiet  is.financed:by  the Ford
must uitimately  pay,  as particularly  the poor of debt  Foundation.
burdened  countries  have  sadly  learned.  They  have  a
right not only to know  what is being borrowed  in  t$orco  Franoes F.  Dfn...:
their name,  but also how  it is being  used.
Some  donors are becoming  more forthcoming,
but there is a long way to go before the critical  conventional  involvement  of VOs  in the  implementa-
information  on donor plans and projects  becomes  tion of a government-  or donor-initiated  project.  In
public information  subject to the kind of public  effective  partnerships,  VOs often  assume  leadership
scrutiny  that is  necessary  to  insure that  public  roles. Even when VOs are not the partnership
moneys  are being used in benefcial and environ-  initiators,  in the type of development  partneships
mentaly sound  ways.  Donors  are asking  NGOs  to  we are advocating  they are equal participants  in
be responsible  critics.  To do so VOs  will  need  open  planning,  problem-solving,  and action-taking  process
access to  donor records and  technical data, as  rather  - rather than  simply  implementors  of projects
should  be their basic  right.  initiated,  designed  and funded  by others This gives
maximum  scope for the VO to perform  its institu-
S. Building  Development  Partnerships  tional catalyst  role in a way seldom available  in
more conventional  projects.
The involvement  of VOs in development  partner-  The case described  in Box 10 involving  a col-
ships differs in essential  respects from the more  laboration  between  an Indonesian  VO, three  gem-
-28-ment  ministries, the  Ford  Foundation, and  the  In Latin America they have been more politically
World Bank in Indonesia in support of new irriga-  active, often seeing themselves as  in fundamental
tion policies and programs aimed at strengthening  opposition  to government.
the role of farmer/irrigator associations illustrates  Within region differences are  sometimes even
the potential of such partnerships. In this instance  more striking than differences among regions. For
the Ford Foundation, itself a VO, had an important  example, in the Asia region India and  the Philip-
role in helping the Indonesian VO establish  itself as  pines are 'nown for the variety and density of their
a credible member of the partnership and in funding  VOs. Yet within India, it is reportedly difficult to
its participation,  find a development  VO in any of thle  three northern
The operating modes of the large donors gener-  states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh
ally do not allow them to play the kind of stipport-  Pakistan and Bangladesh  were once part of the
img  roles in heiping to engage VOs in this type of  same predominately  Islamic country, with few if any
national partnership that the Ford FouAdadwoa  was  NGOs. In less than  two decades, Bangadesh has
able to play in this instance.  Large donors that lack  become home to  some of the  largest and  most
such capability, might find it  useU.  to  ally with  effective  development  VOs in the world. In contast,
organizations,  such as the Ford Foundation, that are  Pakistan may have  tewer development  VOs on a per
better  suited to this nurturing role. Other  founda-  capita basis than any other non-Communist  county
tions or international  private  VOs like Oxfam  or the  in Asia.
World Council of Churches might  also be  good  NGOs in Nepal are limited to a  few charities
allies in such cases.  working under the supervision of the  Queen. The
Further  efforts to  identify and  document ex-  largest VO in Indonesia is barely a tenth the size
amples  of  development partnerships  should  be  of the largest VO in Bangladesh,  though Indonesia
undertaken so that the conditions for their success  is a larger, more populous,  and generaly more dev-
can be better understood and their implications  for  eloped country.
donor strategy and practice explicated.  In Bangladesh  VOs tend to become aU  purpose
community  development  generalists providing  rather
siu dar  services. VOs in India, Thailand, and  the
A RESEARCH  AGENDA  Philippines  are often more specialized.
There  are  also  important  differences among
We have proposed a conceptual lens for examining  countries in the extent to which the legal framework
the  voluntary sector  that  emphasizes its  special  guarantees freedom of association and encourages
capacities  for social  innovation  and responsiveness  to  consequential  voluntary  sector involvement  in nation-
relatively  deprived and  unserved populations. This  al development.  There are similar differences  in the
lens provides insights into the distinctive  strengths  number and strength of support institutions  offering
and weaknesses  inherent in the nature of the volun-  educational, consultancy, research  and  advocacy
tary development  sector, and how these complement  services to the voluntary sector.
those of other types of development  agencies.  Little attention has been given to mapping and
There  has  been  little  theoretically grounded  understanding these differences and the forces that
research on VOs, in part because of the lack of an  have created them. For example,  how have VOs and
appropriate conceptual lens. With  the  benefit of  POs developed differently under authoritarian and
such a lens we can better define a range of research  democratic regimes? What  have been  the  conse-
needs that have important bearing on donor policy  quences of various types of regulatory  and incentive
formulation and  programming action. Among  the  policies? Such knowledge is basic to donor policy
important topics for research are the folowing:  and action intended to strengthen voluntary sector
development.
1.  Voluntary Sector Development  Approaches  to  supporting  voluntary  sector
development  will need to  be very different in the
Voluntary  sectors have developed  quite differently  in  Philippines  or in Andhra Pradesh (India) than in say
different  regions, nations, and  even  in  different  Pakisan,  Nepal or the  Indian Punjab. Yet donors
regions within a gien  country. Voluntary sectors in  have few frameworks available for  understanding
Asia, Latin America, and Afica  each have their  these differences  and their implications.
distinctive  regional characteristics.  In Asia and Latin  What  are  the  characteristics that  define  a
America the voluntary sectors are generally strong.  healthy, vital and  effective VO  community? Does
In Africa the indigenous  voluntary  sector is less  well  Bargladesh provide  the modeL  with its large genera-
established.  In Asia VOs have been inclined to seek  list  VOs  substituting for  government in  offering
out opportunities  for collaboration  with government.  nearly identical services to large rural population?
-29 -Or  is the appropriate model something more like  severely  limited. Obviously  the proper answer is to
the Philippines,  with its diversity  of VOs of differing  do it on a large scale.
political ideologies, policy and  program  commit-  The questions  posed by Annis are best address-
ments, and operating styles? Are there identifiable  ed on  a case study basis. The research task is to
evolutionary stages in  the  development of a  VO  identify  examples  of both successful  and unsuccessfu
community?  What types of support are most impor-  efforts to accomplish  smal  scale, locally controlled
tant at  each stage? These are important questions  development on  a  large scale. Normally the focus
for donors if they are to avoid creating distortions  should be  on reasonably mature efforts that yield
through well  intentioned, but  possibly misguided  clear and easily  documented lessons,  rather than on
application  of their resources.  incipient zfforts in  which it  is  only possible to
Since development catalyst organizations com-  speculate about  prospective results.  Each  effort
monly define  their own performance  in terms of the  selected should be documented and  aayzed  as a
creation and  strengthening of  strong,  self-reliant  case study  to yield lessons  and insights thar might be
POs, no  study of  VO  development performance  translated into other  efforts to  make  sm-Rl-scale
could be complete without serious attention to VO  development  large-scale  policy.
contributions to  the  development of  POs  as  an  Particular attention  should be given to questions
important feature of the institutional  landscape.  such as the foliowing Is  there a  point at which a
The questions involved  are most amenable to  critical  mass of small POs sets loose a new dynamic
analysis on  a  comparative basis.  They  are  also  that  supports  the  spontaneous  generation  and
questions that many VOs and VO coalition bodies  linkage of such organizations?  What are the condi-
need  to  be  asking themselves. Therefore, a  par-  tions conducive  to rich an outcome? Reports on the
ticipatory type  of  research  process  might  prove  Latin American experience suggest that important
appropriate. For example,  the draft study report for  insights into these questions may be found in that
an individual  country migt. serve as the basis for a  region.
national conference  of V(s  in that country  to review  The  proposed documentation should be  done
the report and its conclusions  in a  kind of sector  from a social learning perspective.  The most useful
self-assessment  exercise.  lessons are likely  to address the question of how to
Several  country studies might form the basis for  create and manage the learning process by which a
a  regional conference devoted to  a  comparative  functioning  set of institutional  relationships  emerges
assessment that would help to sharpen the frame-  in support of large scale local development action.
works for  comparative analysis. An  international  Efforts to find blueprints for cookie cutter replica-
conference might then examine patterns of regional  tion are likely  to contribute  only to more large-scale,
differences.  The result would be a much refined set  top-down failures.
of frameworks  for assessing  VO development  in any  In many instances the  successful examples of
given  country, and  a  heightened self-awareness  large-scale  coverage  that provide uscful lessons may
within the  voluntary sectors of  the  participating  not be limited to VOs of the type described in this
countries of the issues they face as a sector.  paper. A  study of  livelihood programs done  by
Judith Tendler for the Ford  Foundation identified
2.  Small Scale Development  on a  large  Scale  six initiatives  that had influenced the lives of large
numbers of poor." One was sponsored by a public
Conventional  concepts  of replication and scaling up  sector enterprise, three by trade  unions, one by a
reflect a top-down  bias in their underlying  presump-  bank, and one by a private consulting  firm. Tendler's
tion that the task involves  defining a  blueprint for  study  provides  an  important  caution  in  such  a
project action and  then engagig  a  large develop-  research undertalkng  it should not look only for
ment  bureaucracy to  stamp  out  replcations  of  examples  in which the chief sponsor is a VO.
projects based on that blueprint over a large area.
Sheldon Annis puts a  different  twist on  the  3.  Medhanisms for VO/PO Funding
conventional  formulation by asking: 'How large can
small become?' Or 'Can  small-scale  development  be  The potential dangers of publc  donors channeling
a large-scale  policy?"m  His questions puts the prob-  large blocks of funds to  VOs and POs have been
lem  in  proper  context. The  genius  of  the  VO  examined in  this  paper.  But  simply  sensitizing
approach is found in its people-sized  units of action  donors  to  the  potential dangers of  inappropriate
and  its local problem-solving  focus, in contrast to  action does not  provide them with a  solution to
the  imposition of an  externally defined blueprint.  their  problem. We  have yet  to  answer the  key
Yet it is true that so long as this is accomplished  question: Are there demonstrated ways to channel
in only a few communities  the consequences  will be  such funds that  are  consistent with enlarging the
- 30 -scale of impact while simultaneously  strengthening  reshaping  global policy  and programs on population
the funded organizations in their distinctive  roles?  and family  planning.
Again a comparative case study approach is the  At the more micro-level  it would be useful to
research method of choice. There is need to pull  examine  the use of formal mechanims for achieving
together the available  data on a variety of different  direct grassroots  input and feedback  into both donor
approaches to  public funding of different types of  and  host  government policy and  programm_g.
NGOs, applying  the conceptual  framework  proposed  Examples  might  include MYRADA's  role in improv-
by this paper to discriminate between development  ing the design and implementation  of World Bank
and welfare interventions, as well as between VOs,  funded projects in India involving  resetlement  of
PSCs, and POs. There should be no  presumption  displaced  populations and the Philippine experience
that  a  funding mcrhanism appropriate to  one or  with the  participation of  VOs  on  regional  and
another of these will prove equally satisfactory  for  provincial  planning councils.
the others  because both the natuie of the ornza-  One  output of the  country studies suggested
tion and the task are likely to differ.  earlier might be an  assessment of  the  extent to
A  ars  step would simply be to do an inventory  which  VOs and POs in the country in question have
of the many mehbanisms  presently in place. These  played useful roles in shaping development poicy
include specialized  organizations such as the Inter-  and programming,  and why.
American  Foundation,  the  partnership  funding
mechanisms  being established  by Canadian  CIDA in  S.  Development  Partnerships
a  number  of  countries of  Asia,  the  efforts of
USAID to expand family  planning service coverage  There  are  numerous experiences that  may  lend
in  Bangladesh through grants  to  NGOs, and  the  themselves  to documentation  and analysis  to achieve
experience  of European governments  in channeling  better understanding  of the dynamics  of development
public resources  through international NGOs to  partnerships,  the special  role of VOs in their forma-
indigenous  organizations.  tion and maintenance,  and the conditions conducive
Once the inventory is complete, a  number of  to their formation.  Examples  include the experiences
experiences that  represent a  range of approaches  briefly described in Boxes 8 and 10 in this paper,
and outcomes should be documented  and analyzed  the LSP initiatives  in Indonesia  described in footnote
from a  comparative perspective in relation to  the  62; and the coOlaboration  of Philippine Business for
issues  identified in this paper. Much of the necessary  Social  Progress  with  government,  the  banking
information  might be compiled  from existing  evalua-  system, and a variety of VOs in Negros Occidental
tion and assessment  documents.O  The resulting  cases  in  a  locally initiated and  controOed land  reform
should provide a  basis for a  contingency  analysis  initiative.
suggesting  the circumstances under which different  It is important to be clear here that the interest
funding mechanisms are  appropriate.  It  wiOl  be  is in cases that involve  joint inter-sectoral problem
important to assess these mechanisms  from a variety  solving,  often in situations that demands expenditure
of perspectives.  Those that are effective  at develop-  of considerable voluntary energy. This is  not the
ing VOs as a  dynamic force for social innovation  same  as  the  case  of  the  multi-sectoral project
may not be the same ones that demonstrate effec-  implementation  committee charged with implement-
tiveness in contributing to smal-scale development  ing a project blueprint.
on a large-scale.
4. VO/PO Policy Partidpation
In relating to NGOs there is a danger that donors
There is growing  interest among donors in the roles  may  equate  small  with  simple. Most  individual
of VOs and POs as sources of grassroots feedback  NGOs are quite small by donor standards, but they
in  the  design, implementation, and  evaluation of  are not simple either in their organizational  form or
projects. Here again  documentation  and comparative  in  their development roles. They are  particularly
analysis of  experience, particularly of  sucessfl  complex  in the aggregate,  in part because the term
experience, is likely  to result in useful lessons.  NGO does not define an organizational  type.
At the macro-level  it might be useful to examine  NGO defines only a  broad  range of types of
the role  and  strategies of environmental VOs in  organizations that  have little in common with one
reshaping the environmental policies of the multi-  another except that they are non-governmental  and
lateral development banks  Going further back in  are legally registered as non-profits. They indude
history  the same questions  might be asked regarding  market-oriented  PSCs,  values  driven  VOs,  and
VO roles and strategies  during the 1960s  and 70s in  member accountable  POs.
- 31  -Even  among  the more  precisely  defined  category  The strongest  VOs and POs respond  to a good
of  VOs some organizations  function purely on  deal  more than  financial  incentives.  Their distinctive
voluntary  commitment,  with  no budget.  Others  have  development  contributions  are found  in the fact  that
well  paid full-time  profesdonal  staff.  Their  commit-  they  are not the same as goverament  organizations
ments  span the range  from  pure relief  operations  to  or businesses.  At the same time they are not im-
development  advocacy  and  the  mobilization  of  mune to  financial incentives,  which if  wrow)y
politically  active people's movements.  The part-  applied  have  the potential  to destroy  the volur.ary
icipants  range  from saints  to scoundrels.  nature of all but the most strongly  self-awsre  of
The most important  development  contributions  VOs and POs. The issues  are complex,  thc neces-
of VOs will often be  overlooked  if  attention  is  sary data elusive,  and the potential for damage
focused on individual  organizations.  Only in the  substantial
aggregate is  it  possible to  appreciate fully the  If there is one central  message  of this analyis,
sector's contribution  to mobilizing  voluntary energy  it is that no resposible  donor should undertake to
in support  of a broad range of social  agendas;  its  wasdist  or 'use'  NGOs  as a part of its development
role in serving  as a  marketplace  of ideas and of  programming  un!ess it  is  prepared to  make a
social  and institutional  innovations;  and its function  substantial  investment  in understanding  their nature
in the promotion  and preservation  of democratic  and their distinctive  roles.  Donors  cannot  automati-
institutions,  in  part as  a  counter weight  to  the  cally assume that exisdng staff experieuce  and
centralizing  and controlling  tendencies  of the state.  training  prepare  them to play  a constructive  role in
These  contributions  are best appreciated  within  the  helping NGOs become more effective  in  their
context of the broader political  and institutional  essential  roles in national  and global  development.
dimensions  of development  that have  so often  been
overlooked.
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